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Student Research submissions 2013 (2013 research options) |
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Gregory Buchanan
30 November 2013
Critiquing Intersectional Analysis: A Postcolonial Feminist Reading of
Jasmine
and Lucy
Bharati Mukherjee’s Jasmine and
Jamaica Kincaid’s Lucy present two
women who are radically different from one another. Jasmine behaves kindly and
is interested in cultivating meaningful, personable relationships, while Lucy
often acts indifferently, abstaining from passive observation only to offer
criticism. Despite being different, the women participate in a variety of
power-conditioned relationships in their native countries and in America.
Throughout the semester, we have studied the Self-Other model of cultural
synthesis, which explains the reconciliation of difference between Self and
Other into a new identity. However, the model often requires Self or Other to
disproportionately sacrifice its difference for the sake of synthesis, whose
identity then unfairly reflects Self more than Other, or vice versa. Solving
this problem requires a privileging of difference over identity. Jasmine and
Lucy are unique women who embody several kinds of difference. Framing their
identities in terms of these qualities draws on the idea of intersectionality,
which easily detects abusive power-relations. Jasmine and Lucy approach many
cultural Others in Hanaspur, the West Indies and America; each woman must be
considered an intersectional Self and evaluated using an improved Self-Other
model to ensure that she is not subject to oppression. Instead of seeking a
synthesis that constitutes a mid-point of difference, Jasmine and Lucy will be
considered to arrive at intersubjectivity if they engage in mutual recognition
of difference with cultural Others. Intersubjective selves recognize one another
as equals without compromising their differences. Investigation of potentially
abusive power-relations will be restricted to the ways in which Jasmine and Lucy
are able to achieve intersubjectivity in the families they encounter. A further
point of analysis is the sexual expectations that sometimes attach to families,
but also occasionally occur on their own. While intersectional analysis is
largely able to explain the ways in which Jasmine and Lucy handle potentially
oppressive encounters, it falls short because it does not consider
intracategorical difference. Nevertheless, even in cases that simple
intersectional analysis cannot resolve, the method still points out interesting
insights that future research in postcolonial feminism may be able to exploit
when theoretical support is available.
Social oppression can take many forms. Individuals traditionally experience
discrimination based on their race, class, gender, and sexuality. Postcolonial
feminists believe that these kinds of oppression overlap and are difficult to
separate. Intersectional analysis treats individuals as unique combinations of
race, class, gender, and sexuality and considers all oppression the same. Lynn
Weber presents intersectional analysis as a means of identifying abusive
relationships of power in all categories: “A race, class, gender, and sexuality
analysis pushes us to confront the power relationships at the core of systems of
inequality. These systems are sometimes described as interlocking dimensions in
a matrix of domination in which race, class, gender, and sexuality represent
axes” (113). The oppression that Jasmine and Lucy experience can be understood
more completely through intersectional analysis than ordinary descriptive
methods. Weber explains that methods other than intersectional analysis are less
effective because they cannot account for oppression that resist simple
categorization (114). Because intersectionality gives a multi-categorical
representation of an individual, it improves the traditional Self-Other model.
Difference usually distinguishes Selves from Others, but an intersectional Self
contains its difference within its identity. Evaluating a relationship between
an intersectional Self and Other is not an exercise in determining whether Self
is unfairly imposed upon to reach a point of difference, as one might expect.
Instead, the question becomes whether Self and Other achieve a level of
interpersonal equality that transcends difference. One must determine whether
they have become two Selves that freely recognize one another’s difference.
Intersubjectivity is the state in which mutual recognition of difference occurs;
it is the relationship of reciprocal subjectivity between Self and Other that
transforms them into two Selves. William Luijpen explains that reciprocal
subjectivity occurs in relationships of love, hatred, and indifference.
Individuals in any of these three relationships regard one another as
“co-existing” and “unconcealed consciousnesses” instead of unapproachable Others
concealed by off-putting differences (190-191). Difference no longer stands
between those who have achieved intersubjectivity because it has been subsumed
by their intersectional identities. Treating Jasmine and Lucy as intersectional
Selves facilitates understanding of how they achieve intersubjectivity. Jasmine
and Lucy enter into relationships of reciprocal subjectivity with Others in
their respective native countries and America. Jasmine’s relationship with
Others in Hanaspur and America is predicated on love, which operates according
to Luijpen by Jasmine expressing affection and sympathy for Others (218). Lucy’s
method is almost diametrically opposed. She relates to Others in the West Indies
and America through antipathetic rejection. She achieves intersubjectivity, but
Luijpen characterizes her method as that of phenomenological hatred. Lucy
perceives that the “stare,” or censorious attention of Others, infringes on the
free expression of her intersectionality and reduces her potential for future
development (198-199).
Cultural Others exert influence through institutions and individuals. Weber
claims that intersectional individuals experience kinds of oppression from both
sources: “Race, class, gender, and sexuality systems operate on both the
macro-situational (institutional) and micro-socio-psychological level
(individual) levels, and are simultaneously expressed, interlocking systems”
(115). Institutional and individual oppression merge when individuals support
oppressive communal or organizational laws. Policy-makers create
macro-structural opposition on the basis of race, class, gender, or sexuality.
Individuals complying with oppressive policies generate
micro-socio-psychological oppression as microcosms of the larger institutions to
which they belong. Oppression is almost always extended from a position of
social dominance toward “concealed consciousness” whose difference is not
treated intersectionally. Mediating difference between Self and Other creates
concealment that hinders reciprocal subjectivity. Intersectional Selves achieve
intersubjectivity through a mutual understanding of difference. Jasmine and Lucy
respond to potentially oppressive power-relations by recognizing the difference
of institutional and individual Others and treating them sympathetically and
antipathetically.
Instances in which the intersectional identities of Jasmine and Lucy achieve
intersubjectivity must be drawn from a context amenable to postcolonial feminist
methodology. Patricia Collins argues that family and its influence on the
sexuality of its members is an institution that produces interesting
power-relations: “One dimension of family as a privileged example of
intersectionality lies in how it reconciles the contradictory relationship
between equality and hierarchy. The traditional family ideal projects a model of
equality” (158). The families of Hanaspur and the West Indies reconcile equality
and hierarchy differently than American families. In every case, however, the
institution of family expresses relations of power with its members in its
attempt to equalize them. Jasmine and Lucy interact with several families that
aim to compromise their intersectional identities. The protagonists use
radically opposite phenomenological methods to resist the oppressive
power-relations, yet both achieve intersubjectivity.
The traditional family to which Jasmine is born in Hanaspur exerts power by
regarding Jasmine as inferior to male children because she requires a dowry.
Jasmine resists the gender and class oppression of her family’s attempt at
equalization by acknowledging the custom of the dowry but refusing to allow it
to prevent her from marrying. She finds a husband by drawing on the connections
of her brothers, despite being a dowry-less bride: “I was a sister without
dowry, but I didn’t have to be a sister without prospects” (Mukherjee 70).
Prospects for marriage require Jasmine to be affectionate and cooperate with
social expectations. Jasmine does this and marries Prakash. Treating the
Hanaspur family structure, especially its tradition of dowry, as a cultural
Other, Jasmine recognizes that she is different from the ideal, first-born,
wealthy daughter of traditional dowries. It is this recognition of difference
that allows Jasmine to achieve intersubjectivity through affection. It manifests
itself as resourcefulness that refuses to be constrained by the lack of a dowry.
Jasmine maintains her intersectional difference and resists the oppressive
power-relations of the Hanaspur family institution by garnering equality for
herself on her own terms. She obtains what any wealthy, first-born bride with a
substantial dowry would, and the community of Hanaspur recognizes her marriage
as legitimate as any other.
Unlike the traditional environment of Hanaspur, the New York home of Taylor and
Wylie allows Jasmine to affirm her intersectionality by recognizing her entrance
into a professional class of caretakers. Wylie classifies Jasmine as a
professional in the hierarchy of her family: “Wylie made me feel her younger
sister. I was family, and I was professional” (Mukherjee 175). Jasmine contrasts
her professional title of caregiver with the class-oppressive title of
maidservant given to women doing the same work in Hanaspur. By acknowledging the
oppression of the Hanaspur system and accepting the title of caregiver, Jasmine
resists class oppression. Although most power-relations in the institution of
family are oppressive, Wylie’s bestowal of a professional title also includes a
place in the family. Wylie causes Jasmine to feel as though she is a part of the
family, so this equalization is not oppressive. Taylor and Wylie’s family may
not achieve absolute equality, but they do not use the conflict between
hierarchy and equality implicit in their family to alienate Jasmine, as
Jasmine’s family presumably did to maid-servants in Hanaspur. Jasmine achieves
intersubjectivity by expressing affection in the form of gratitude toward Taylor
and Wylie after recognizing the difference between maid-service and care-giving
in the institution of family.
Lucy does the same kind of work for Lewis and Mariah that Jasmine does for
Taylor and Wylie. However, Lucy relates to Lewis and Mariah’s family
antipathetically, while Jasmine behaves affectionately toward Taylor and Wylie’s
family. Both could be rightly called caretakers, but only Jasmine receives this
title and is treated as a significant member of her family. Lucy is considered a
visitor: “It was at dinner one night not long after I began to live with them
that they began to call me the Visitor. They said I seemed not to be a part of
things” (Kincaid 13). The title visitor carries negative connotations, but Lucy
makes this unfriendly title personal. She remains detached from the family. Lucy
does not pursue meaningful friendships with members of the family, avoids
self-association, and refuses to cultivate a sense of fellow-feeling. Instead,
she recognizes the class oppression that her position carries with it, which
distances her from the rest of the family. Her difference is unavoidable to her.
She is aware of her lower social station, yet she does not consider it to be an
exclusively negative characteristic. She incorporates it into her identity,
makes it a part of herself, and recognizes her place in relation to the rest of
the family. Her antipathetic way of coming to terms with the family’s hierarchy
of members leads her into intersubjectivity. She is able to relate to Lewis and
Mariah as an equal, despite having been deemed an outsider.
An insightful observer, Lucy notices that Mariah is relatively weak-willed when
compared with women of the West Indies. While Lucy’s mother competed for her
husband’s affection and eliminated people who weakened her, Mariah often cries
over Lewis, “Mariah’s eyes were in one of the various stages of a cry” (Kincaid
112). Mariah is unable to ascertain the feelings of her husband: “Mariah did not
know that Lewis was not in love with her anymore” (Kincaid 81). These
observations evidence Lucy’s cognizance of the power-relations implicit in Lewis
and Mariah’s family. Lucy is able to evaluate them objectively, ultimately
preferring the model in which her mother participated to Lewis and Mariah’s
system. Lucy rejects the oppressive attempts of Mariah to impose on her the
power-relations of the institution of the American family.
Mariah applies the family power-relations in which she participates into the
realm of sexuality by advising Lucy to use contraceptive devices. Lucy reveals
that remembering Mariah’s advice interferes with the freedom of her sexual
experiences: “I was feeling that I was made up only of good things when suddenly
I remembered that I had forgotten to protect myself, something Mariah had told
me over and over that I must remember to do” (Kincaid 67). Mariah acts as a
surrogate mother by constantly reminding Lucy to use contraception. This creates
an unequal relationship in the family, placing Lucy in the role of a child who
needs constant correction. Despite Mariah’s attempts to impose oppressive
equality, Lucy does not follow Mariah’s advice. Lucy’s “forgetting” to use the
devices, whether inadvertent or not, is an unsympathetic response consistent
with her achievement of intersubjectivity. Lucy recognizes the importance of
avoiding an unwanted pregnancy, but she does not worry about her period (Kincaid
69). Instead, she mentions a remedy taught to her by her mother. This
alternative means of preventing pregnancy is competitive with Mariah’s
contraceptive devices. By invoking her cultural difference, Lucy rejects
Mariah’s attempt to oppress her sexuality. Intersectionality demands the
preservation of the whole of an individual’s cultural background, which in this
case, includes cultural remedies for unwanted pregnancies. Lucy turns to these
and proves herself equally able as Mariah to care for her body.
Lucy’s somewhat intimate relationship with Peggy is a further rejection of
Mariah’s sexual oppression. Close homosocial relationships threaten the
power-relations exemplified by Mariah’s established heterosexual family. “This
new friendship of mine drove Mariah crazy. She couldn’t tell me what to do,
exactly, because she wasn’t my parent, but she gave me lectures about what a bad
influence a person like Peggy could be” (Kincaid 63). Lucy and Peggy engage in
some intimate activities, like kissing, which violate the compulsory
heterosexuality imposed by Mariah. Sexuality is an important part of Lucy’s
intersectional identity, which she asserts in defiance of Mariah’s lectures.
This behavior allows constitutes an intersubjective denial of the influence of
Mariah as a representative of her family institution. Lucy gains from the
friendship of Peggy, which presents an alternative model of companionship to the
traditional heterosexual family institution. However, Lucy’s relationship with
Peggy is not the first or only case in which she expresses sexual liberty.
Lucy previously resisted sexual oppression by refusing to submit to
patriarchal domination while in the West Indies. Her first boyfriend, Tanner,
attempts to indulge in masculine pride after discovering that he is the first to
sleep with Lucy, yet Lucy resists the patriarchal authority implicit in his
assertion: “I did not care about being a virgin and had long been looking
forward to the day when I could rid myself of that status, but when I saw how
much it mattered to him to be the first boy I had been with, I could not give
him such a hold over me” (Kincaid 83). Lucy achieves intersubjectivity in her
relationship with Tanner by unsympathetically attributing his masculine
accomplishment to the natural operation of her female body. Being female is a
part of Lucy’s intersectional identity, and drawing on this aspect allows her to
refuse the sexual and gender oppression of Tanner. She becomes the equal of
Tanner because she offers an alternative account of her bleeding, which
privileges her feminine ownership of her body over his masculine invasion of
it.
The figure of patriarchal authority that Lucy resists in Tanner is inverted in
the untraditional Prakash, whose authority Jasmine accepts because it is
interested in producing a genuine model of equality. Jasmine marries Prakash
while in Hanaspur, and he does not insist on oppressing her gender or sexuality.
Prakash establishes power-relations with Jasmine that allow her to achieve
greater equality than she would have in the more traditional Hanaspur family
institution. His willingness to let his wife speak his first name evidences his
non-patriarchal position and commitment to equality (Mukherjee 77). Raje Swari
Sunder Rajan claims that allowing a wife to use her husband’s first name permits
her to be “constituted as a subject through her self expression” (84). Jasmine
is able to communicate with Prakash on equal terms, which is the condition of
intersubjectivity. Through sympathetic cooperation with Prakash, Jasmine
unlearns the behaviors expected of a traditional wife and preserves the
difference implicit in her intersectional identity. Prakash recognizes the
gender and sexual aspects of Jasmine and insists that she reject the traditional
oppression that the Hanaspur family imposes on women in the context of
marriage.
Oppressive power-relations do not only exist in family relationships conjoined
with sexual expectations. Sexual oppression also occurs outside of the family,
with rape being the most extreme form. Jasmine and Lucy approach the
power-relations established by Others outside of the institution of family
through different feminist narrative techniques. Susan Brison comments that
narration of sexual abuse is an essential form of self-expression that has the
potential to sustain a victim and facilitate a coherent re-construction of
identity (49-50). This allows Jasmine and Lucy to maintain their intersectional
identities and achieve intersubjectivity. Jasmine responds to being raped by
Half-Face by first disassociating with herself, which is expected behavior for
rape victims, and then invoking an alternative identity--Kali. The summoning of
Kali marks Jasmine’s use of the technique of transcendence in narrating her
sexual assault. Rajan identifies transcendental narration as a common strategy
in feminist narratives. Transcendental narration functions by associating an
elevated identification of the victim with the rapist (68). Jasmine “marries”
Half-Face to Kali by killing him after the rape. She describes Half-Face as the
man who corresponds to the identity of Kali when listing all of the women she
has been (Mukherjee 197). Transcendental narration of rape allows Jasmine to
achieve intersubjectivity because it preserves the sympathy with which she
approaches Half-Face as a cultural Other. Marriage is ordinarily a relationship
of affection, and describing Jasmine-as-Kali as the wife of Half-Face suggests
affection common to husband and wife. Jasmine is able to express a sort of
transcendental sympathy toward Half-Face that is evident in her narration.
Ultimately she refuses to allow the sexual oppression that Half-Face imposed on
her to affect her approach of the Other by responding with a different
Self--Kali.
Lucy embraces sexuality outside of the family and uses the narrative technique
of immanence to participate in a sexual experience that affirms her
intersubjectivity. Paul reminds Lucy of Mr. Thomas, the fisherman who used to
abuse Myrna. The event that creates the remembrance in Lucy is Paul placing his
hands in a fish tank; Mr. Thomas’s hands, lost at sea, are unknowable to Lucy,
so Paul’s immediately present hands become a substitute for those of Mr. Thomas
(Kincaid 109). The relationship Mr. Thomas had with Myrna was abusive, yet Lucy
is attracted to it. She says is jealous and would have gladly traded places with
Myrna (105). By entering relations with Paul, Lucy creates an “immanent
substitution” that allows her to experience a relationship with Mr. Thomas.
Rajan explains immanence as a technique of feminist narration that allows for
the substitution of actors, perpetrators or victims on a symbolic basis (72).
For Lucy Mr. Thomas’s hands symbolize a sexual encounter that affirms her sexual
liberty.The unpleasant situation that Myrna did not appreciate Lucy treats as an
expression of her intersectional identity. While what Mr. Thomas did is socially
unacceptable, Lucy chooses to accept the relationship, contrary to social
standards on age-appropriate relations. Her choice exemplifies the strong
antipathy Lucy feels toward social expectations of sexual behavior.
In addition to using narrative techniques to interact with sexual
power-relations outside of the institution of family, Jasmine and Lucy also
address the social convention of monogamous relationships. Jasmine observes the
expectation and remains with one intimate partner at a time. Lucy is unwilling
to be constrained to one partner and refuses the idea of a closed relationship.
She considers simultaneous engagement with multiple partners to be an expression
of her sexual liberty. While still dating Paul, Lucy initiates a relationship
with Roland (Kincaid 116-117). This behavior defies the patriarchal authority
Lucy perceives in the idea of monogamous relationships. Although it may be
argued that Lucy does not achieve intimacy with Paul or Roland because she
refuses to completely commit to either man, this is Lucy’s intention. The
refusal to commit to one man is an act of antipathy that allows Lucy to access
intersubjectivity. She is concerned with the preservation of her intersectional
identity--especially its sexual aspect--and chooses to sacrifice docile
commitment for behavior that defies the traditional sexual power structure.
As sexual power-relations can occur inside or outside of the family, the
institution of the family can also exist without attached sexual
power-relations. Some families do not create sexual expectations, like the
impromptu family Jasmine participates in when Wylie leaves Taylor and Duff. “On
those nights, we--Duff, Taylor, and I--became a small, self-sufficient family,
and I told myself, guiltily, that everything might really work out” (Mukherjee
183). Through a relationship of affection, Jasmine realizes intersubjectivity
with Taylor and Duff. There is no oppression to which Jasmine responds; she
merely draws on the gender aspect of her intersectional identity to comfort
Taylor and Duff, who were previously cultural Others. Jasmine’s entrance into
family institutions that do not impose sexual expectations sometimes highlights
her method of affection more prominently, as when she begins a family with Bud.
The family Jasmine creates with Bud does not impose sexual expectation, while
Lucy’s biological family strives to suppress her sexual identity. Bud adopts Du
and marries Jasmine because of his affectionate sympathy for both. Thus the
membership of his family is not based on conformity to rigid power-relations,
but rather the same kind of phenomenological method of love that Jasmine herself
practices. Bud’s relationship with Du is not as substantial as Jasmine’s, but
his decision to adopt is sufficient to reach reciprocal subjectivity. He
respects Du, as Jasmine does. Bud also respects Jasmine and does not place any
oppressive demand on her intersectional identity. Jasmine continually relates to
Bud through affection and sympathy as she cares for him because of his
disability. Her sexuality is mutually expressed with her role as his caretaker,
and this dual expression of affection allows her to achieve intersubjectivity
with Bud easily. Understanding Bud’s family as an institution founded on
sympathy provides an interesting contrast with Jasmine’s biological family, an
institution founded on antipathy. Lucy considers family, even her own biological
family, as an institution that oppresses gender and sexual identity. When
writing to her mother, Lucy reveals what she believes to be the central tenant
of her childhood: “I reminded her that my whole upbringing had been devoted to
preventing me from becoming a slut” (Kincaid 127). Lucy achieves
intersubjectivity by recognizing the power-relations of her childhood family and
rejecting them. Her parents’ guidance is the intersectional oppression that Bud
and Jasmine do not cultivate in their family. Lucy unsympathetically dismisses
the advice of her parents and engages in sexually indiscriminate behavior.
Claiming to enjoy sexual liberation places Jasmine in a relationship of
reciprocal subjectivity with her mother, who realizes Lucy’s independence and
can no longer prevent it.
Intersectional analysis of the family and its connection to sexuality is a
powerful method of discovering power-relations, but it is not comprehensive.
When considering the class aspects of Jasmine and Lucy’s identities, some
complications arise that must be addressed. Family as a field of analysis
sometimes conflicts with the class to which Jasmine and Lucy belong. One example
is Lucy’s reaction to Dinah’s affair with Lewis. Lucy criticizes what she
perceives to be the unauthentic nature of Lewis and Mariah’s relationship, which
is governed by sexually-oppressive power-relations. Yet she also dislikes Dinah,
who subtly works to disrupt it. Lucy considers Dinah to be preoccupied with
wealth and status, but she cannot condemn Dinah’s method of obtaining Lewis
because its antipathetic nature resembles Lucy‘s own method of achieving
intersubjectivity. Both Lucy and Dinah establish relationships through
antipathetic means: Lucy is more obvert in her method, while Dinah covert and
hides her activities behind a veneer of class privilege. Dinah aspires to the
lifestyle of Lewis and Mariah, which is her form of intersubjectivity, and
through an unsympathetic, adulterous affair with Lewis, she believes she obtains
it. Lucy considers the relationship between Dinah and Lewis to be genuinely
passionate, a sign of authenticity: “This was not a show, this was something
real” (Kincaid 79). Dinah uses her social status, which approximates Lewis’, to
gain access to him and engage in a relationship that allows her to experience
sexual liberty, outside of the traditional power-relations of the institution of
family. Although Lucy does not care for the class power-relation that Dinah
exercises to achieve her end, Lucy must accept the sexual liberty of Lewis and
Dinah’s affair because it is the same kind of sexual freedom that she seeks for
herself. The fundamental difference between the kind of sexual liberty Dinah is
able to enjoy and the kind Lucy enjoys is class. Lucy is limited in her sexual
expression by the class aspect of her intersectionality, which seems to be an
implicit but vital aspect of the institution of family and sexual expectation.
Lucy also interprets education as a function of class, as she ends a
relationship with Hugh on the basis of their class difference. Hugh is
well-traveled and easily able to recognize the difference implicit in the gender
and race aspects of Lucy’s intersectional identity. He knows that she is from
the West Indies, not some generic islands, and he presumably knows her country
from non-recreational experience (Kincaid 64-65). The power-relations Hugh
establishes with Lucy produce equality, yet Lucy does not love Hugh (Kincaid
67). The class difference distances Lucy and Hugh, as Lucy considers him only a
reminder of her homeland. While Lucy approaches Hugh as a cultural Other, the
relationship of reciprocal subjectivity that she experiences with him rests most
strongly on the basis of a familiarity with her country Hugh obtained by virtue
of his class. This complicates the question raised by simple intersectional
analysis of power-relations because Hugh ostensibly recognizes the differences
of Lucy, as she recognizes his. Hugh is unlike other members of his class
because he is sincerely interested in Lucy’s country. Yet Lucy rejects him
because she recognizes this difference--his genuine interest in the West
Indies--as being only a poor resemblance of the country itself. It is not Hugh
himself whose difference she recognizes--only a part of him, and it is achieving
intersectionality with this part than enables her to unsympathetically reject
the whole of him. Lucy achieves intersubjectivity by rejecting Hugh in spite of
his being a well-informed member of his class, but the kind of oppression that
she rejects seems to defy explanation. Hugh does not insist on traditional
patriarchal power-relations, so he is not sexually oppressive and he respects
the gender-aspect of her identity. It appears that class alone separates Lucy
and Hugh, but an explanation beyond what intersectional analysis can provide is
required to understand the discreet sort of oppression that Lucy rejects.
Intracategorical analysis, a more intricate form of intersectional analysis,
would be required to explain what aspect of Lucy’s class-related intersectional
identity is oppressed.
The influence of class also appears in the family relationship of Jasmine and
Prakash. Prakash establishes power-relations that affirm Jasmine’s
intersectionality, yet his refusal of the traditionally patriarchal role of
husband may be partially influenced by his social status. Professor Devinder
Vadhera supports Prakash and encourages him to pursue opportunities in America.
Prakash attributes his social position to the mentorship of the professor:
“’Without this man, I’d be like your brothers. I’d be just tinkering and
tampering’” (Mukherjee 83). Prakash is able to escape the traditional employment
opportunities of Hanaspur through support from a member of a higher (or, at
least, more skilled) social class, which probably contributes to his
non-traditional views of family power-relations. Other men, like Jasmine’s
brothers, remain outside of the privileged relation of mentorship and likely
establish families with traditional power-relations. While all intersectional
difference is located in the singular identity of Jasmine, understanding
Prakash’s motivations for recognizing Jasmine’s difference is important if the
exact manner in which Jasmine is able to achieve intersubjectivity with Prakash
is to be understood. Jasmine respects education and can relate to Prakash’s
ambitions. It may be class-oriented recognition of difference that allows
Jasmine to enter a relationship in which she is free to express her gender and
sexual identities freely. Again, simple intersectional analysis cannot account
for investigation into individual categories, only evaluation of oppressive or
supportive behavior regarding the whole. Intracategorical difference, if it were
included in intersectional analysis, might offer insight into how
class-similarity, or class-motivated sympathy, mitigates unconditional
acceptance of Jasmine’s free expression of gender-based and sexual expression.
Intracategorical analysis would explain the exact reason why Jasmine relates to
Prakash sympathetically, and how he recognizes her difference, while also
explaining why Lucy relates to Hugh unsympathetically, and what exclusion of
difference justifies her rejection of him.
While intersectional analysis does much to explain the ways in which Jasmine and
Lucy maintain the race, class, gender, and sexuality aspects of their
identities, it does not do enough. Intracategorical complexities in Jasmine’s
relationship with Prakash and in Lucy’s relationships with Dinah and Hugh remain
unexplored, leaving questions about the exact aspects of intersectional identity
in conflict unanswered. It is clear that class plays an important role in
understanding the micro-socio-psychological power relationships of families and
their sexual expectations, but its exact function in several contexts is
uncertain. It is necessary to understand difference within the “traditional’
categories of race, class, gender, and sexuality to fully appreciate the
intersubjectivity that Jasmine and Lucy achieve. Leslie McCall argues that
intersectional analysis must include a study of intracategorical difference if
the power-relations of any system are to be fully identified: “Although broad
racial, national, class, and gender structures of inequality have an impact and
must be discussed, they do not determine the complex feature of day-to-day life
for individual members of the social group perfectly, no matter detailed the
level of disaggregation” (1784). McCall observes that despite researchers’
interest in “difference and diversity within [the traditional categories]”
(1784), intracategorical complexity has yet to be integrated into mainstream
intersectional analysis. It is one of several methods that require further
development.
Some feminist scholars suggest that because intersectional analysis encounters
difficulties, a new method should be devised to study oppressive
power-relations. Naomi Zack proposes movement beyond intersectionality to
“relational-essentialism” (8), a theory that propounds a universal definition of
woman and assesses oppression by determining whether individual women are
allowed to express their essence by satisfying the definition. Zack describes
her understanding of essentialism: “An essence can be something that all members
of a group have in common, which is a necessary and sufficient condition for
membership in that group. Women are those human beings who are related to the
historical category of individuals who are designated female from birth or
biological mothers or primary sexual choice of men” (8). Zack argues that women
satisfy the definition if they meet one or more of the criteria that describe
women. But even if the conditions of the definition are treated disjunctively,
using the definition to evaluate oppressive power-relations is difficult because
it is incompatible with the Self-Other model. Assessments of difference between
Self and Other must be made phenomenologically. A basic principle of
phenomenology is that the appearance of a thing conveys its essence.
Relational-essentialism disagrees with this principle, asserting that the
essence of a thing may be other than it appears. Intersectionality can make use
of phenomenological investigation to assess a wider variety of instances of
possible oppression than relational-essentialism can. Moreover,
relational-essentialism cannot capture the changes that women such as Jasmine
and Lucy undergo while adapting to new environments. Zack’s theory attempts to
relate all women to a historically conditioned category. While Jasmine and Lucy
do not change so much as to immediately defy the category, their change is
radical and may progress to the point that the category is compromised.
The extent of Jasmine and Lucy’s identity-transformation at least points out a
weakness with Zack’s theory of relational-essentialism that intersectional
analysis need not be concerned with. Both Jasmine and Lucy describe a
substantial process of personal development that effectively produces a new
identity. “We murder who we were so that we can rebirth ourselves in the images
of dreams” (Mukherjee 29). Lucy explicitly points out the transformation of her
interests and life-path: “I had been a girl of whom certain things were
expected, none of them too bad: a career as a nurse, for example; a sense of
duty to my parents; obedience to the law and worship of convention. But in one
year of being away from home, that girl had gone out of existence” (Kincaid
133). Intersectional analysis, when combined with the study of intracategorical
difference, can comprehensively assess whether Jasmine and Lucy have been
subjected to oppression, despite their evolving identities.
Relational-essentialism is predicated on the idea of categorical-affiliation;
therefore, its assessment of oppression is based on an idea of static identity
that both Jasmine and Lucy disaffirm. Even a series of disjunctive categories is
not sufficient to capture the kinds of unique oppression women like Jasmine and
Lucy endure. Intersectional analysis combined with the study of intracategorical
difference is the better method of studying instances of oppression.
While intersectional analysis is able to provide compelling descriptions of the
ways in which Jasmine and Lucy interact with the power-relations of families and
their expectations of sexuality, and even expectations of sexuality outside of
family or families that do not have expectations of sexuality, further
development in the field of postcolonial feminism is necessary to resolve
certain difficult cases. Intracategorical analysis is a much-needed advance in
understanding intersectional identity that little feminist research supports.
Jasmine and
Lucy evidence the overlapping nature
of the traditional categories of intersectional analysis, which is at the same
time a strength and a weakness. In most investigations of institutional
oppression, simple intersectional analysis is sufficient, yet further
development would increase understanding of power-relations that could
potentially reveal other sites of intersectional investigation. Reading the
novels intersectionally remains the most comprehensive attempt to assess Jasmine
and Lucy’s respective efforts to achieve intersubjectivity.
Relational-essentialism and other models of analysis that rely on
non-phenomenological methods are substantially disadvantaged because they cannot
access the Self-Other model of difference.
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the Remaking of a Self. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002. Print.
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Postcolonial, and Feminist World. Ed. Uma Narayan and Sandra Harding.
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2000. 156-177. Print.
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Luijpen, William. Existential
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McCall, Leslie. “The Complexity of Intersectionality.” Signs 30.3 (2005):
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Mukherjee, Bharati. Jasmine. New
York: Grove Press, 1989. Print.
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Imagined Women: gender, culture and post colonialism. London: Routledge,
1993. Print.
Weber, Lynn. Understanding Race, Class,
Gender, and Sexuality: A Conceptual Framework. New York: Oxford UP, 2010.
Print.
Zack, Naomi. Inclusive Feminism: A Third
Wave Theory of Women’s Commonality. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
Print.
