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Sample Final Exam submissions 2013 (2013 final exam assignment) |
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Gregory Buchanan
11 December 2013
Global Identity Answers Dialectical Synthesis
Alfred North Whitehead famously commented that all Western philosophy can be
considered a series of footnotes to Plato. And among the Greeks, Plato was not
unique in considering the polis to be the social institution most directly
responsible for preserving individual freedom. Most Americans are aware, if only
vaguely, of the Platonic intellectual tradition from which they inherit their
belief in the primacy of the political state. Course objective three identifies
the problem that many Americans have interacting with colonial-postcolonial
discourse. Because the international relationship between colonizing and
colonized governments defies the paradigm of localized, autonomous government
with which Americans are familiar, colonization and postcolonialism seem
foreign. Over the course of the semester, I used the Self-Other model of
dialectical synthesis to study colonial-postcolonial problems of identity.
Attempts to reconcile disparate cultural identities met with limited success in
my mid-term examination and research paper. Now at the end of the semester, I
realize that producing a synthesis between the colonizer and colonized is not
the ideal method of arriving at viable postcolonial identity. Abandoning the
traditional paradigm of the polis to embrace cosmopolitan identity seems a surer
method of incorporating previously colonized countries, former colonizers, and
the rest of the world into cooperative political identification. A global model
of identity would operate by identifying all cultural values as equally
belonging to one “domestic,” world-wide identity, creating a single world-polis
and eliminating the concepts of “foreignness” and the Other. Several course
texts support cosmopolitanism, yet others raise significant moral questions that
must be addressed if abusive power-relations implicit in false syntheses are to
be avoided. The most important question is how cosmopolitan ethics can answer
the question of social progress, which seems to operate through the
subordination of certain cultural values. Recognizing the necessity of global
identity is the principal truth I have learned from the course.
Upon reviewing my mid-term examination and research submission, I realized that
the Self-Other model cannot fairly or accurately resolve cultural differences
supported by abusive power-relations. The Self-Other model resists a global
model of identity because it attempts to produce a synthesis through reconciling
difference, a dynamic concept that fails to conform to the static identity
demanded by cosmopolitanism. In my mid-term examination, I listed four
impediments to true synthesis between Self and Other. Oppression operates
through mutually detrimental power-relations that sometimes include
appropriation of technology by colonizer and the colonized: “Appropriation of
technology inhibits cultural exchange for both the colonizer and the colonized
through a confusion of values” (3). In George Orwell’s “Shooting an Elephant,”
the protagonist is compelled to shoot what is simultaneously technology for the
colonized people of India and an aesthetic symbol of colonization from the
perspective of the colonizer. The elephant represents a fundamental disconnect
between two cultural worlds; their vastly different perceptions of the
elephant’s cultural status and purpose signify the striking contrast that the
concept of difference can project even onto a mundane object. Political
power-relations underpin these radical differences in value-orientation. The
colonizers and colonized perceive the elephant differently, each group
privileges its perception of the elephant over that of the other group, and they
use political power (more specifically, solidarity, in the case of the
colonized) to insist on the superiority of their perception.
To reconcile cultural difference between colonizing countries and colonizers,
the power-relations that support value-oriented claims of privileged difference
must be understood and dissolved. This requires that they be accurately
identified. Postcolonial feminism has developed a method that has the potential
to do so, yet further development is required to ensure its complete accuracy.
In my research submission, I examined intersectional analysis as a vehicle of
ascertaining the nature of abusive power-relations within the contexts of
familial and sexual expectations Jasmine and Lucy experience. Much insight can
be gleaned from treating oppression of Self and Other as a whole, but cases
within the traditional categories of oppression are sometimes difficult to sort
out. An intracategorical method of analysis must be employed to ensure complete
fairness. My conclusion in the research submission expresses the position of
intracategorical difference in postcolonial feminist scholarship:
“Intracategorical analysis is a much-needed advance in understanding
intersectional identity that little feminist research supports” (19). Because
the Self-Other model cannot resolve the political power-relations that privilege
differences of value, I believe its capacity to produce a genuine synthesis
between cultural identities has yet to be realized.
An alternative model of postcolonial identity should be able to encompass a
plurality of cultural identities while avoiding the problem of power-relations.
Cosmopolitan ethics, which posits global identity as the equivalent of a
dialectical synthesis among all world-cultures, amalgamates the traditional
categories of oppression into a harmonious system of cultural plurality. Instead
of needing to examine the exact relations of oppression, as postcolonial
feminism may with intracategorical difference, cosmopolitanism adopts an
anticategorical approach, so it subsumes opposition into a general concept of
non-identity. Oppression is still acknowledged, but it is placed outside of the
value-systems of every culture in the world. This makes the idea of “superior”
difference impossible. If there were an Other in cosmopolitan system of ethics,
it would be the proclivity of every Self to privilege its own
value-orientations. Because oppressive power-relations are at the base of claims
of identity-difference, their exclusion would eliminate competitive claims of
values. Difference itself would be universal and therefore static. This means
that different cultures could not oppose values, such as the aesthetic and the
technological, and apply them to the same object, such as an elephant. In a 2009
final exam, Allen Reid observes the incompatibility of cultural pluralism with
the Self-Other model: “When [Jasmine] arrives in America we see the idea of the
‘other’ is not a binary system; e.g., when she first arrives in Florida she is
not American, ergo, she is the ‘other,’ but she is not the only ‘other’ there.
She was among many immigrants from different parts of the world” (2). As Reid
points out, the Other is not a collective identity. There are “many” Others that
each engage in reciprocal relationships of otherness among themselves.
Cosmopolitan ethics avoids having to synthesize every constituent Other and
instead assumes a global Self.
Course texts and objectives support the project of global identity, especially
as it relates to the concept of place. Objective six describes attachment to
place in relation to global culture, stating that modern cultures tend to view
place in terms of amorphous space, while traditional cultures attribute
significance to place. However, first-world, modern cultures consider place to
substantially influence identity. This is an extension of the primacy of the
political state in the Western intellectual tradition. Cosmopolitan ethics would
create a global sense of belonging, or oikeiôsis, that many people presently
experience through national citizenship or extended family. Derek Walcott in
“The Season of Phantasmal Peace” imagines “the huge net of the shadows of this
earth / in multitudinous dialects, twittering tongues, / stitching and crossing
it” (2-4). The net comes to envelop the whole world, “like the vines of an
orchard” (17), suggesting a universal interconnectedness. Dialectical synthesis
of world cultures cannot readily produce the vision of unity Walcott imagines,
offering instead only a divided world of deeply rooted power-relations. In
“Passage to India,” Walt Whitman also expounds a vision of global unity. “All
these separations and gaps shall be taken up and hook’d and / link’d together /
The whole earth, this cold, impassive, voiceless earth, shall be / completely
Justified” (5. 36-19). Although Whitman wrote in response to a scientific and
technological advance, the opening of the Suez Canal, he explicitly praises the
unification of the cultural values of the earth into a common song: “Finally
shall come the poet worth that name, / The true son of God shall come singing
his songs” (5. 30-31). His vision, like Walcott’s, looks forward to the adoption
of global identity, as opposed to the traditional place-oriented model.
Global identity would solve many of the problems that arise from the meeting of
cultures. The idea of universal belonging associated with cosmopolitanism
carries with it a rudimentary notion of justice. Its origins in ancient Greece
confirm this, as Zeno of Citium, the first scholarch of the Stoic school,
frequently said that universal belonging is the beginning of justice. In Chinua
Achebe’s Things Fall Apart, the legal system of Umuofia relies on ancient
traditions that differ from those of the colonizing government. A group of
tribal egwugwu judge cases according to ancient customs, which outside
governments cannot access. When the colonizing government makes a decision about
a land case, it does so without consulting the traditional customs. Okonkwo
protests: “Does the white man understand our custom about land?” Okonkwo is
later told that the colonizers view the customs of Umuofia as immoral (176).
This is an example of the privileging of difference that troubles the Self-Other
model of dialectical synthesis. The colonizing government prefers its
interpretation of justice because it has political power. It uses its power to
impose its standard of justice on Umuofia, which fails to yield a true
synthesis. Universal belonging would naturally produce an equitable result in
the land case because all parties would associate with a single identity.
Self-interest would motivate fairness without external coercion.
Cosmopolitan ethics is not without its own difficulties, however. Unfavorable
representations of the unity of humanity suggest a disinclination on the part of
colonizers to adopt a universal identity. Chinua Achebe observes in “An Image of
Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of
Darkness” that the possibility of commonalty with the Africans is
disconcerting for their colonizers: “It is not the differentness that worries
Conrad but the lurking hint of kinship, of common ancestry” (2). A shared
history is a vital part of a universal history, and the histories of Africa and
Europe are substantially intertwined. Yet Achebe argues that Africa is often
used as a foil for Europe, so as to support the idea of civilization.
Privileging European difference by devaluating African “negation” threatens
global identity, a concept of universal civilization that incorporates
Afrocentric and Eurocentric value-systems harmoniously. In Rudyard Kipling’s The
Man Who Would Be King, a similar assessment of common identity is used to
justify mass exploitation. Daniel assumes a commonalty between Englishmen and
the people of Kafiristan: “They're the Lost Tribes, or something like it, and
they've grown to be English” (2.42). He is not interested in cultivating the
relationship between the traditions of England and Kafiristan to achieve a
unified identity; instead, he intends to exploit the human capital of
Kafiristan. The interest of colonizers in manipulating the idea of a shared
identity to their advantage also threatens the nature of traditions unique to
certain cultures. Cultural authenticity is often subordinated to what colonizing
societies perceive as social progress.
Global identity cannot accommodate relationships of privilege between cultural
values; however, colonizers often manipulate values of the colonized in the name
of progress. A principal method they use to do so is education or technical
training. In Heart of Darkness, an
African has been trained to operate the boiler of a ship. Marlow, who describes
the man as an “improved specimen” (98), elaborates on the training that was
given: “[The African] was useful because he had been instructed; and what he
knew was this--that should the water in that transparent thing disappear, the
evil spirit inside the boiler would get angry through the greatness of his
thirst, and take a terrible vengeance” (99). The “improvement” that training
brings to the African culture is a privileging of technical knowledge over the
aesthetic. In George Orwell’s “Shooting an Elephant,” the elephant is technology
for the colonized and an aesthetic object for the colonizer. This difference in
perception is an indicator of underlying relationships of difference, supported
by political power-relations. Similarly, Marlow depicts the religious beliefs of
the African, an essential cultural value, as aesthetic opinions that have been
manipulated for the technological purposes of the colonizer. The colonizer
privileges the utility of the technological use of religion above its culturally
authentic aesthetics. A problem arises for cosmopolitan ethics when the utility
of cultural manipulation is justified on the basis of social progress. Educated
Africans can contribute to the progress of civilization, while the uneducated
cannot, the assumption goes. Colonizers further argue that only colonizing
countries can advance civilization. Addressing the supposed benevolence of the
idea of progress reveals important normative political views associated with
global identity.
The universal belongingness of cosmopolitan ethics includes a conception of
social progress that does not rely on privileging the cultural values of the
colonizer above those of the colonized. Cosmopolitan justice defies the colonial
model of advancement through imperial expansion. A sense of domesticity is
extended to all countries, which creates self-identification apart from
ownership. Global identification enables one to feel at home anywhere on Earth,
not merely in one’s country of origin. Derek Walcott’s “A Far Cry From Africa”
illustrates the tension that privileging cultural values causes: “The gorilla
wrestles with the superman” (25). The struggle in which the two countries engage
causes the speaker to confront a difficult choice: “how choose / Between this
Africa and the English tongue I love?” (29-30) Cosmopolitan ethics eliminates
the need to choose between cultures, as difference no longer divides cultural
identities. The consequence is a universal sense of domesticity. Affairs of one
country have universal importance, as Walcott concludes: “How can I turn from
Africa and live?” (33) The life of the individual is intimately associated with
the status of every country, and associating with other countries cannot sever
the relationship. There is no difficult choice or struggle. Progress as defined
by cosmopolitanism consists in the globalization of concerns that would
otherwise be isolated to their country of origin. The ubiquity of cultural
concerns also benefits the identities of individuals because it promotes greater
continuity between colonizing and colonized countries.
Place-oriented identity fragments when individuals travel between colonizing and
colonized countries, partially because of encounters with abusive
power-relations. Jasmine associates the emergence of an ideal Self with
disassociation from a place-oriented, colonized identity: “We murder who we were
so that we can rebirth ourselves in the images of dreams” (Mukherjee 29). Lucy
expresses a similar transformation: “I had been a girl of whom certain things
were expected, none of them too bad: a career as a nurse, for example; a sense
of duty to my parents; obedience to the law and worship of convention. But in
one year of being away from home, that girl had gone out of existence” (Kincaid
133). Both women react to abusive power-relations by altering their identities.
Cosmopolitan ethics insists on the integrity of personal identity, which
provides greater stability than place-oriented identity. Freedom apart from
identification with the polis becomes possible when values of colonized
countries become equally valued with those of colonizing countries. This yields
post-national equality, which advances the project of global selfhood. The
integrity of individual identity is largely connected to global identity, which
the fourth-wave of postcolonial movement evidences. A return to formerly
colonized countries requires a stable method of self-identification.
Postcolonial studies recognizes the difficulty of cultural re-integration; a
universal system of cultural values would solve this problem effectively as the
world-polis emerges.
I have been fascinated with problems of postcolonial identity throughout the
course. Working with the Self-Other model of dialectical synthesis proved
interesting but not as productive as I had hoped. Global identity offers a
viable method of reconciling cultural differences without involving the
troublesome concept of synthesis. While cosmopolitan ethics has yet to gain the
philosophical credibility that Platonic political theories enjoy, its potential
to support the emergence of fourth-wave postcolonial migration cannot be
overlooked. The objection made to cosmopolitan ethics regarding social progress
can be answered by observing the distinction between identification and
ownership. A more satisfying and theoretically coherent political system emerges
from the adoption of global identity. Cosmopolitan social progress and the idea
of universal belongingness have the potential for philosophical expansion and
would greatly benefit postcolonial studies if adopted.
Gregory Buchanan
11 December 2013
Reconstituting Self Through Internal Synthesis
In the model of cultural synthesis we have studied throughout the semester,
difference stands between the identities of Self and Other. Usually difference
expresses an attribute of the identity to which it belongs, and these attributes
must be reconciled with those of an opposing identity if a synthesis is to be
achieved. An assumption of the model is that difference is always external to
the identities involved. It occurs in the mediating space between Self and
Other, ideally where the two identities can be made to reach a point of mutually
profitable compromise. However, synthesis within an identity also seems possible
through the internalization of difference. The presence of an Other is not
always necessary for a Self to encounter an attribute foreign to itself.
Exploring the possibility of internal synthesis may explain the re-constitution
of Self that several course texts illustrate. Intertextual descriptions of the
stages Selves undergo in response to foreign attributes will unify the process
in a continuous narrative that may also yield insight into the fourth-wave
movement of postcolonialism. An intertextual reading of
Jasmine,
Passage to India, “The Second
Coming,” and Things Fall Apart
reveals the capacity of the Self to internally synthesize or reconstruct itself
in response to foreign attributes of cultural Others.
Jasmine’s explanation of the identity of Self suggests an initial stage of
complete individuation prior to internal synthesis. When consulted about the
nature of the Self, Jasmine describes its constitution in terms of several
self-contained micro-identities that connect indeterminately: “What if the human
soul is eternal--the swamis say of it, fires cannot burn it, water cannot drown
it, winds cannot bend it--what if it is like a giant long-playing record with
millions of tracks, each of them a complete circle with only one diamond-sharp
microscopic link to the next life, and the next, and only God to hear it all?”
(Mukherjee 127) She regards each “track” as its own entity that cannot be
influenced by the one before or after. This conception seems problematic, as
several texts suggest the reality of character development. More puzzling is the
pairing of identities Jasmine also describes, especially since the
correspondences are in terms of male-female relations. “I have had a husband for
each of the women I have been. Prakash for Jasmine, Taylor for Jase, Bud for
Jane. Half-Face for Kali” (Mukherjee 197). Each female identity is presented as
having a male counterpart, so gender-relative identity may indicate
relationships of Self and Other, yet no explanation is given regarding
continuity in the partnerships. How the transition from one relationship to the
next affects Jasmine’s identity is unclear at this point, but Jasmine seems to
answer the question by positing that identity can respond to spontaneous changes
in circumstance.
Jasmine intimates the potential for identity to evolve when presented with
favorable or unfavorable alterations in environment. Any response to foreign
attributes at this stage is inadvertent. “And I do believe that extraordinary
events can jar the needle arm, jump tracks, rip across incarnations, and deposit
a life into a groove that was not prepared to receive it” (Mukherjee 127).
Assuming that there is substantial continuity between micro-identities, the
difference between one and the next may not be significant, yet the reaction
does prove a self-initiated connection to the external environment not dependent
on the presence of an Other. Jasmine gives an example of an identity that
abruptly ends upon the death of its partner: “When Jyoti’s future was blocked
after the death of Prakash, Lord Yama should have taken her” (Mukherjee 127).
Although it is unclear whether Jyoti dies in sense that Jasmine believes
micro-identities can die, the emergence of another micro-identity definitely
occurs. The absence of the Other corresponding to Jyoti seems to warrant the
complete termination of Jyoti herself. Whether the Self is dependent on the
Other for its continuity remains unanswered, but the absence of the Other seems
to qualify as a foreign attribute for the Self. Absence may be the attribute
most diametrically opposed to the Self, actually.
The speaker of Passage to India
examines whether Self may deliberately internalize difference to initiate the
modification of its identity. Using the literal passage to India to signify the
spiritual condition of Self, the speaker observes an internally-produced longing
for exploration: “Ah who shall soothe these feverish children? / Who Justify
these restless explorations?” (5. 14-15) The desire for exploration seems
self-initiated in response to the possibility of travel. Metaphorically, travel
may suggest progress from spiritual mediocrity to spiritual excellence, or
personal enhancement in some other sense. The possibility for travel is not a
completely present Other and neither is India. An identity must be known for it
to exist phenomenologically, and it must be positive, so the unknown India does
not qualify as a completely present Other. Only in response to a
partially-present other does the Self reconcile a foreign attribute, unrealized
spiritual advancement, with its present condition. To emphasize the
self-generated desire for exploration, the speaker identifies the explorer as in
possession of himself or herself: “O soul, repressless, I with thee and thou
with me, / Thy circumnavigation of the world begin, / Of man, the voyage of his
mind’s return, / To reason’s early paradise,” (Whitman 7. 5-8). The explorer
possesses his or her soul, or Self, and progress toward the undiscovered Other.
At this stage, the process of internal synthesis seems to end with
self-initiated recognition of a possible Other.
The Self continues toward internal synthesis by desiring interaction with the
Other, which it now recognizes through an incremental approach. The speaker
establishes a relationship between the present and the past, which the Self is
able to internally recognize: “For what is the present after all but a growth
out of the past? / (As a projectile form’d, impell’d, passing a certain line,
still keeps on, / So the present, utterly form’d, impell’d by the past.)”
(Whitman 1. 13-15) This objective relationship of the passage of time, or
experience in general, causes the Self to anticipate future growth upon meeting
the Other. Aspiring to self-improvement suggests recognition of present
imperfection. The speaker expresses this recognition as the Self acknowledging
the more perfect condition of an Other: “Athwart the shapeless vastnesses of
space, / How should I think, how breathe a single breath, how speak if, out / of
myself, / I could not launch, to those, superior universes?” (Whitman 8. 29-32)
The “superiority” of unknown universes is the foreign attribute to which the
Self initiates its internal change. Ideally the Self aspires to radical and not
marginal improvement, which the speaker indicates by naming physical entities
that harbor significant spiritual meaning: “O sun and moon and all you stars!
Sirius and Jupiter! / Passage to you!” (Whitman 9. 17-18) Having acknowledged
the Other and fully formed a desire for its presence, the Self completes the
final stage of internal synthesis and admits that attributes that reflect the
nature of the Other can be internalized to signify aspects of the Self.
In response to an almost completely present Other, the Self originates
comparisons between its attributes and those of the Other prior to their
synthesis. In William Yeats’s “The Second Coming,” the nature of dialectical
synthesis is perceived in the re-iterative manifestations of history. The title
alludes to the return of Christ, whose incarnation is not supposed to materially
change, only appear again on the Earth. In the same sense, the Self can
internally recognize the possibility of expressing its attributes in a new
identity--the identity it will produce upon its synthesis with the Other.
Because the synthesis between Self and Other is not an exact replication of
either identity, the description of history offered by the speaker can also be
applied to dialectical synthesis: “Turning and turning in the widening gyre”
(1). Both Self and Other are reflected in the identity of the synthesis; all
syntheses may create the figure of a non-repeating gyre if combined. The speaker
illustrates the non-repeating natures of history and dialectical synthesis with
two images. “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; (3). This image seems
related to course objective six, which discusses the tendency of traditional
societies to attribute significance to place, while modern societies view place
in terms of undifferentiated space. The second image reveals a “new” center: “A
shape with lion body and the head of a man,” (14). Because the Sphinx combined
two consecutive symbols of the zodiac, Virgo and Leo, it was understood by
ancient Egyptians to mark the center of the universe. Because the Self has not
yet synthesized with the Other, its preparation is internal and consists of
recognizing the nature of the synthesis of difference. The internal synthesis of
Self ends with its recognition of the pattern of dialectical synthesis; a fully
present Other becomes evident to the Self subsequently.
Internal synthesis can be understood in terms of masculine and feminine
identities, as a re-constituted Self interacts with foreign attributes without
fully encountering an Other. Self re-constitution appears concretely in Chinua
Achebe’s Things Fall Apart. When
Okonkwo lives in his fatherland, Umuofia, he belongs to one aspect of his
parentage and not to the other. “A man belongs to his fatherland and not to his
motherland” (Achebe 133). Okonkwo does not recognize the absence of the Other,
which is his motherland, Mbanta, but he acknowledges the existence of several
other villages. Presumably he is aware of his motherland prior to his exile.
Influences from villages within Umuofia constitute the foreign attributes which
Okonkwo reconciles within himself. A member of the tribal judiciary, Okonkwo
works closely with representatives of all of the nine subsidiary villages of
Umuofia to produce decisions based on their various customs. These sources of
cultural difference permit Okonkwo to re-constitute himself through internalized
difference. Okonkwo comments on the customs of other villages, especially
relating to marriage, and observes their differences. When Okonkwo is exiled
from Umuofia and must live in Mbanta, he encounters the cultural Other with
which his identity is synthesized.
Okonkwo is more amenable to synthesis with his motherland because of the
internal re-constitution he underwent in his fatherland. Although the exile is
painful for Okonkwo, he can withstand it because of his hope to return to
Umuofia. When he appears to suffer impatiently among the kinsmen of his mother,
Uchendu explains that the motherland is central to his identity: “It’s true that
a child belongs to its father. But when a father beats his child, it seeks
sympathy in its mother’s hut. A man belongs to his fatherland when things are
good and life is sweet. But when there is sorrow and bitterness he finds refuge
in his motherland (Achebe 134). Having lived in both the fatherland and the
motherland, Okonkwo’s return to Umuofia is not an experience with a genuine
Other. Although Umuofia changed in his absence, and he lost his place of honor
in the tribal judiciary, Okonkwo finds that many traditions are the same.
Masculine and feminine influences on his identity have blended to produce a
cooperative Self that facilitates his re-integration into Umuofia. Although
Okonkwo does not regain his position of trial leadership--and is denied further
reconstitution while in the fatherland--he realizes considerable benefit from
the Self-orientation already in his possession. Like Okonkwo, many possessors of
postcolonial identity are in ideal positions to re-integrate into societies that
are experiencing substantial economic development.
The fourth-wave of postcolonialism consists of movement toward previously
colonized countries, such as India. While its potential has not yet been fully
realized, trends of economic development are expected to continue in its favor.
People who have identities influenced by the cultures of these countries, either
through full synthesis or re-constitution, have a definite advantage if they
choose to immigrate. In “A Passage From India,” Suketu Mehta explains:
“Indian-Americans will help America understand India, trade with it to our
mutual benefit. Just as Arab-Americans can help us fight Al Qaeda,
Indian-Americans can help us deal with the emerging economic superpower that is
India. This is the return of the gift of citizenship” (3). Through
re-constitution of Self, Americans can take advantage of the growing forth-wave
economic trends; this would involve remaining in the United States and exposing
oneself to the foreign attributes of Indian culture. A more extreme version of
preparation is complete synthesis: one would re-locate to India and synthesize
one’s identity completely. Masculine and feminine influences on identity could
also be explained in terms of secondary nationalities, but many Americans do not
maintain dual-citizenship or participate in the cultures of radically different
nations.
Self has the capacity to re-constitute itself through internal synthesis. The presence of an Other is not necessary for internal synthesis, as attributes of foreign identity can be internalized by the Self autonomously. Masculine and feminine attributes of identity can express the nature of postcolonial identity achieved through re-constitution, especially as it relates to the fourth-wave of postcolonialism. Course objective 2a asks how colonial and postcolonial fiction may help people better understand our global future. Understanding identity-relations in an economically global world can be difficult, but postcolonial fiction often features characters who are removed from their homelands and subsequently re-introduced. Similarly, characters frequently adapt to new cultures, which could encourage Americans to embrace economic trends that may encourage immigration to another country. Political science relations between countries on the basis of immigration also appear peripherally in postcolonial fiction.
