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American Literature: Romanticism research assignment Student Research Submissions 2015 Research Essay |
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Gregory Buchanan
12
May 2015
Limited Free Will in Nathaniel Hawthorne and Stephen Crane
Many critics argue that Nathaniel Hawthorne's dark Romantic "Young
Goodman Brown" and "The Minister's Black Veil" and Stephen Crane's Naturalist
Maggie: A Girl of the Streets are
written from systems of strict determinism that completely deny free will.
Because Hawthorne's stories involve Puritan characters and settings, many read
them as reproducing the theological fatalism of the Puritans. Additionally,
because of Stephen Crane's association with the Naturalists, his
Maggie: A Girl of the Streets is
often read to propound the truth of severe social and biological determinism.
Some critics, such as David Fitelson, claim that Crane's determinism is so
severe that it approaches moral nihilism in its assertion of the inapplicability
of moral concepts (184). However, neither Hawthorne nor Crane advances
determinism to the complete exclusion of free will. Both authors propose
moderate forms of determinism that perceive constraints on human will to be
compatible with its free exercise. Hawthorne's determinism is theological, but
it is not as severe as the theological fatalism of the Puritans; Crane's
determinism is social and biological, but it readily admits the applicability of
moral concepts to human conduct. The narrator in
Maggie: A Girl of the Streets offers
information about the choices of characters that leads readers to make moral
judgments about them. Interestingly, the moderate determinisms of Hawthorne and
Crane are of comparable intensity. While they disagree about the force that
principally constrains the human will, Hawthorne and Crane attest to the reality
of undetermined moral action. Each author offers his characters decision-making
opportunities that involve choosing between alternative courses of action.
Although their characters sometimes choose poorly, it is evident that they
determine their own choices. Decision-making in Nathaniel Hawthorne's "Young
Goodman Brown" and "The Minister's Black Veil" is best understood in light of
Hawthorne's moderate determinism, as readings which assume theological fatalism
or severe determinism fail to account for the authenticity with which his
characters elect one moral action over another; similarly, the narration in
Stephen Crane's Maggie: A Girl of the
Streets suggests that the decisions of characters should be evaluated from
the perspective of Crane's moderate determinism. The likeness of the authors'
opinions regarding free will reveals an interesting continuity between the dark
Romanticism of Hawthorne and the Naturalism of Crane that indicates surprisingly
similar worldviews.
Many critics argue that Hawthorne employs the theological fatalism of the
Puritans; however, his work agrees with a more moderate form of determinism,
which admits the possibility of free will. Peter Thorslev offers a helpful
analysis that clarifies the distinction between metaphysical determinism and
theological fatalism. "Determinism is the hypothesis that for every event in the
physical or psychical world, there must be a necessary and sufficient cause"
(144). This means that the determinist can point to a cause for everything that
happens, whether in one's mind or in one's external environment. Moreover, the
causes of things must be such that they could not cause anything else except for
those particular things. For example, the passage of the Earth around the Sun
causes an individual to become one year older. Nothing else causes this, and if
an individual has turned a year older, it is because the Earth has passed
completely around the Sun. The determinist investigates other sequences of cause
and effect in order to understand the world; he or she knows that these
sequences are orderly, and that nothing can interfere with them. Thorslev
observes that readers sometimes expect authors to observe certain rules of cause
and effect when building characters: "If a novelist analyzes his character's
deliberations and decisions, we demand that he give us sufficient motivation for
the subsequent action, and that he provide grounds for this motivation in the
character's past environment and inherited capacities" (146). Hawthorne's
characters are determined by rules of character development common to all
fiction, but this kind of technical determinism is different from moral
determinism. The determinism involved in character development does not
substantially affect an examination of the free will of characters because it
does not focus on instances in which a character exercises his or her will; it
is principally concerned with the overall construction of characters, not their
decision-making. To clarify moderate determinism by contrast, Thorslev explains
the theological fatalism of the Puritans as a kind of severe determinism
situated in religious terms: "American Puritans believed that the world and each
individual in it is predetermined to damnation...each and every conversion is an
interruption of a natural causal sequence by divine intervention or
interposition" (148). The difference between determinism and theological
fatalism is that the former admits of regular sequences of cause and effect, but
the latter does not. God can intervene or not intervene in the moral
decision-making of anyone He chooses for no reason. Thorslev argues that
Hawthorne is a determinist because he offers his characters "moments of
decision," even if they "occur antecedent to the story's main action" (149).
Hawthorne's protagonists make self-determined moral decisions that initiate
sequences of subsequent causes and effects, even if those initial decisions were
relatively innocuous. For this reason, his characters do have free will, even if
it is limited by their own decisions.
The moments of decision that Hawthorne offers his characters demonstrate
that his determinism is moderate because they
allow for alternative choices, which are impossibilities in theological
fatalism. Richard Fogle describes the purpose of
Hawthorne's "device of multiple choice," also called his "ambiguity
device" and "formula of alternative possibilities," as: "to suggest a meaning
while simultaneously casting doubt upon it, or to offer two interpretations at
once of the same incident" (344). When a character has the power to evaluate
conflicting viewpoints or entertain competitive interpretations of a
situation, he or she possesses a moment of decision. More than one course of
action is available to him or her, and the courses are mutually exclusive.
Metaphysicians consider this ability to choose between alternatives a
crucial condition for free will as understood in moderate determinism. Although
characters may be influenced to choose because of some internal disposition,
previous experience, or other external pressure, the choice is still considered
free. While Hawthorne meets both of these requirements in "Young Goodman Brown"
and "The Minister's Black Veil," the initial moments of decision in each story
take place before the story begins. In "Young Goodman Brown," Goodman Brown has
already made an appointment to leave home; in "The Minister's Black Veil,"
Reverend Hooper has already decided to wear the veil. Following the sequence of
consequences that results from Goodman Brown's and Reverend Hooper's choices is
not consistent with theological fatalism. The theological fatalist does not
believe that consequences necessarily occur as they have in the past; he or she
believes that God may randomly intervene in the sequence. The structure of his
stories suggests that Hawthorne rejected the theological fatalism of the
Puritans and subscribed to moderate determinism instead.
While Hawthorne is associated with theological fatalism, Crane is often
associated with severe social and biological determinism that resembles moral
nihilism, but his narration often suggests the ethics of a moderate determinist
who believes in free will. Harold Beaver comments that according to
the deterministic messages of Mendel, Ricardo, Marx, Darwin, Freud, and
Malthus: "Man was trapped: he was the unsuspecting victim of genetic and
economic and political and evolutionary and psychological forces, including an
ever-spiraling population growth" (186). Some critics believe that Crane adopted
the social teachings of these philosophers and that
Maggie: A Girl of the Streets is
intended to reflect the tragedy of a family genetically and socially
predetermined to lower-class, violent living. David Fitelson, a proponent of
this position, describes the moral landscape of the novella: "Since there are no
meaningful alternatives to a life of violence, conventional notions of morality
are without application." His argument mostly rests on Crane's admission of the
power of the tenement environment in which Maggie is raised (184). Contrary to
Fitelson, Max Westbrook argues that Crane is neither a believer in pure free
will nor a severe determinist. Crane's answer to the metaphysical problem of
free-will is moderate determinism: "The relation of Crane's characters to
society, for example, is not properly described as either 'black' determinism or
'white' free will, but rather as a 'grey' struggle" ("Affirmation" 220).
Westbrook finds "affirmative" content in the narration of Maggie, which seems to
imply in several instances that Maggie's "downfall is inevitable only under the
precondition of human irresponsibility" ("Affirmation" 221). In several cases,
characters fail to help Maggie, and each failure contributes to her downfall.
Crane reveals the faults of other characters through expectations he implicitly
inserts in narration regarding them. Like Hawthorne's, Crane's determinism
allows for limited free will, based in moments of decision. Narration is the
vehicle Crane uses to communicate the reality of free will: decisions of
characters are reported, as well as the alternative choices they could have
made.
Crane not only presents his moderately determinist ethics in
Maggie: A Girl of the Streets by
reporting the reality of alternative choices for characters through narration,
but also by maintaining a reasonable standard of free will. Moderate determinism
recognizes that free will is not absolute because moral agents have internal and
external limitations placed on their agency. Everyone is born with qualities
that make certain tasks easier or more difficult than others; to some extent,
these differences facilitate or hinder the will. Natural athleticism makes
joining sports teams easier for some than others. Nevertheless, moderate
determinism holds agents responsible for their decisions: people are compelled
to play sports to the best of their abilities, no matter what natural advantage
or disadvantage they may have. Westbrook proposes a standard for Crane that
seems to capture this idea: "Stephen Crane's social ethic is based on a
universal principle which holds all men responsible for doing the best they can
with what they have been given" ("Social Ethic" 588). People are not responsible
for what they cannot achieve due to forces and circumstances beyond their
control. This conception of free will preserves the idea of freedom while
rendering it accessible, despite personal challenges. Although it is very
commendable, some would object that it is unpractical or untrue to life. David
Fitelson maintains that the world of
Maggie: A Girl of the Streets is governed by violence and that only the
violent survive (186). This assessment of the novella confuses action with
intention, or, in this case, survival with ethical intention. Westbrook writes
that it is a mistake to assume that "what is real in ethics is determined by
actual circumstance, by actual success or failure" (589). The consequence of
believing that Maggie's world is, and should be, governed by the strongest and
most violent is that "novels must allow material success to the good and the
true and must heap material failure upon the evil and the false" (590). Because
Maggie's world is not ideal, and the most moral characters are not the most
prosperous, this conclusion does not follow. So the novella must be evaluated
according to the system of moral intentions it establishes, instead of the
actual moral reality it portrays. Since nihilists do not believe in moral
intentions, Crane is not a nihilist, only a moderate determinist, much like
Hawthorne.
Hawthorne's moderate determinism influences "Young Goodman Brown," but in
order to ascertain how Goodman Brown should be read in light of it, his
character must be considered in terms of the environment of the witches'
meeting, and in terms of his relationship to the rest of humanity. The
environment of the witches' meeting projects a feeling of unreality, and if the
meeting is unreal, then Goodman Brown cannot be held morally responsible for his
actions during it. The description of
the congregation suggests that the crowd of unholy Puritans is both present and
absent, or real and unreal: "As the red light arose and fell, a numerous
congregation alternately shone forth, then disappeared in shadow, and again
grew, as it were, out of the darkness, peopling the heart of the solitary woods
at once" (54). Hawthorne may be employing the Puritan belief that the Devil can
manufacture the appearance of whomever he pleases without summoning the actual
person. According to David Levin, "The devil has the ability to impersonate
innocent people, as was argued in the Salem witch trials" (346). This supposed
ability leads the reader to question the reality of the witches' meeting.
Goodman Brown may have been confronted with images of people he had no way of
knowing were not present. If so, he would not be responsible for acting as if he
thought that those people actually were present. But Hawthorne suggests that it
was within Goodman Brown's power to know the difference between spectral
illusions and actual presences of people. Paul Hurley comments that it is
"beyond the limits of fiction" to ask whether the people assembled ever intended
to be evil; the reader is supposed to assume that they are (411). In the same
way, Goodman Brown is supposed to believe that the congregants actually support
the Devil, as he has no other information available. Hurley's reading makes
Goodman Brown responsible for the correctness of his perception of the
environment, and insists that even if the congregants were worshippers of the
Devil, this should not have affected his moral position.
Although Goodman Brown remains responsible for his conduct at the
witches' meeting despite the deceptiveness of its environment, his relationship
to humanity suggests that he may have been predisposed to meet with the Devil
because of his indwelling sin, a premise Hawthorne would have rejected. Paul
Miller offers two ways in which Goodman Brown's character may be understood: he
is either a representative of all humanity, and he meets with the Devil because
of the predisposition to sin all people share, or he is a representative of a
particular type of person, who meets with the Devil because of some peculiar
attraction to sin (255-6). If the former possibility is true, then Goodman Brown
is not responsible for his going to meet with the Devil because his sinful human
nature, which he did not choose to possess,
compelled him to do so. However, it is unlikely that Goodman Brown is
intended to represent all of humanity. Miller argues that the story develops
certain aspects of Goodman Brown's character that are unique to only some
people. Specifically, Goodman Brown seems more prone to wild indulgence than
some people: "In truth all through the haunted forest there could be nothing
more frightful than the figure of Goodman Brown" (53). Moreover, Goodman Brown
is described as a demoniac, one who is possessed by demons (53). Since this is
not true of all humanity, Goodman Brown seems more depraved than most people and
cannot serve as a universal representative. Miller claims that Goodman Brown
represents only "a weaker type" of person that is susceptible to corrupt
spiritual influences, such as the deception of the Devil (262). So he remains
responsible for his own sinfulness. Under Hawthorne's moderate determinism, the
story remains an account of an individual brought into contact with the Devil,
not through his human tendency to sin, but through his own particular
sinfulness. This interpretation implies a more optimistic message than it would
have had Goodman Brown been a representative of all humanity.
In order to completely establish
his accountability, Goodman Brown's relationship to humanity must not only be
examined in terms of the nature of his sinfulness, but also in terms of his
affiliation with Puritanism. If the story asserts that Goodman Brown met with
the Devil because he felt justifiably secure that such a meeting would not
compromise his righteous standing before God, then Goodman Brown cannot be
responsible for his choosing to meet in ignorance of the danger. The Puritanism
to which Goodman Brown subscribes includes a doctrine of election that claims
sinning cannot endanger the salvation of God's elect, since the elect are chosen
by the grace of God and not on the basis of righteousness. Thomas Connolly
maintains that even though the elect are unknown to others and to themselves,
Goodman Brown seems confident that he will go to Heaven (372). This presumption
is not strictly in keeping with Puritanism, suggesting that Goodman Brown either
misunderstands the doctrine of election, or intends to abuse it. The latter is
more likely than the former, which makes Goodman Brown responsible for the
spiritual dangers he takes on by choosing to meet with the Devil. Connolly
maintains that the story critiques the spiritual security that the doctrine of
election offers Puritans (375). As it diminishes the responsibility of the
individual to act morally, the doctrine of election is contrary to Hawthorne's
moderate determinism. More generally, the theological fatalism of Puritanism
runs counter to personal responsibility that Hawthorne emphasizes in
"Young Goodman Brown." Both the quality of his perception of the environment at
the witches' meeting and his relationship to humanity, do not excuse Goodman
Brown from meeting with the Devil. Although he might have been better informed,
he never encounters any external or internal factor that mitigates his
responsibility. The moderate determinism of Hawthorne condemns Goodman Brown for
failing to exercise the restraint he could have used to avoid the Devil and his
revelation.
Reverend Hooper in "The Minister's Black Veil" may also be evaluated in
light of Hawthorne's moderate determinism, but some critics have suggested that
he should be read as a figure that is completely determined by his role as an
antichrist, embodiment of sin, and possessor of sinful nature. Each of these
readings absolves Hooper of moral responsibility, so they must be answered
before moderate determinism can assess his choosing to wear the veil. Although
Hooper's veil frightens some of his parishioners, others are comforted by it, so
his ministry is not rendered completely ineffective by the veil. Yet, William
Stein portrays the veil as a barrier between Hooper and his congregation: "The
people are alienated, not only from him but also from the word of God which he
preaches" (387). Drawing on passages from Paul's Second Epistle to the
Corinthians, Stein argues that Hooper's veil is an endorsement of the Old
Testament because it recalls the veil Moses wore to prevent the Israelites from
seeing the glory of God depart from his face. He reasons that this endorsement
is tantamount to opposing Christ: "For when Mr. Hooper affects the veil, he
symbolically undermines the dispensation of the new covenant of Christ, denying
as it were the doctrine of salvation" (390). But Stein does not consider that
Hooper's motives for wearing the black veil are as existential as they are
symbolic. Whether or not a specific act warranted Hooper's adopting the veil, he
associates wearing it with fundamental truths of human existence. It suggests
universal secrecy, as all people will "cast aside our veils" only on Judgment
Day (35). Until then, everyone wears one: "I look around me, and, lo! on every
visage a Black Veil" (67). In many ways, Hooper brings himself closer to all of
humanity by wearing the veil and can hardly be considered an enemy of Christ.
Moreover, the veil makes Hooper a more effective minister in some respects:
...he became a man of awful power over souls that were in agony for sin" (54).
Stein largely ignores the few but meaningful benefits the veil provides Hooper.
When he does acknowledge them, he presents them negatively. The introspection
that the veil inspires in Hooper's congregation is characterized unfairly as
"sinful" (388). Overall, Hooper's veil does not seem to interfere with his
duties as a minister so severely as to render him an antichrist. He remains
effective with certain difficult-to-reach groups in his community and clearly
preaches salvation to the sinner. For these reasons, he should be evaluated
according to Hawthorne's moderate determinism--his performance as a minister in
relation to his overall ability to perform-- not as a figure intended to be
understood as an antichrist.
Hooper should not be read as an
antichrist, or as an embodiment of the sin of pride. He does not treat others
judgmentally, even though his veil does symbolize the judgment of the Bible; on
the contrary, many people mistreat him when he asks for sympathy. Earl Stibitz
believes that Hooper communicates two truths by wearing the veil. One is the
sinfulness of humanity, a message that Stibitz claims Hooper represents with
relative humility; the other is a claim of superiority that follows implicitly
from Hooper's being the only one wearing the veil. Stibitz argues that while
Hooper may not intend to suggest that he is morally superior to others, the veil
conveys superiority, whether intended or not (184-5). The second claim is
problematic because it is supposedly occurs without Hooper's consent, and it
affects his moral agency, so it challenges a reading of Reverend Hooper as
moderately determined. However, it is questionable whether the second claim does
implicitly follow from the first. In some instances, Hooper explicitly voices
his fear and distaste for the veil, even inviting others to join him, yet he is
refused. Elizabeth refuses him, despite his desperate plea: "O! you know not how
lonely I am, and how frightened, to be alone behind my black veil. Do not leave
me in this miserable obscurity forever!" (46). Hooper also invites sinners
behind his veil, who say they "had been with [Hooper] behind the black veil"
before their conversions (54). Nevertheless, many community members mock Hooper,
children flee his approach, and some "would make it a point of hardihood to
throw themselves in his way" (51). All of these seem more judgmental, and more
prideful, toward Hooper and his veil than Hooper is toward anyone else. Hooper
cannot be held responsible for the negative reactions of the community, as he
offers, and sometimes begs, people to join him behind the veil. Those who do not
are either uninterested or abusive. It seems Hooper does all he can to be
approachable, and an evaluation from the perspective of moderate determinism
would find that he is not prideful.
In addition to being neither an antichrist nor a representation of the
sin of pride, Hooper is not a representation of the sinful nature of humanity
because his wearing the veil is not inherently sinful. Hooper states that his
decision to wear the veil was motivated by mourning: "I, perhaps, like most
other mortals, have sorrows dark enough to be typified by a black veil" (39).
Although these sorrows may be the consequences of sin, they are not themselves
sinful. We are not given a specific sin that Hooper committed, but Robert
Morsberger maintains that specific instances of sin were not required in
Puritanism for an individual to be considered a sinner: "Hooper need not have
committed any specific sin; for the hardened Puritan, his humanity was sinful
enough" (456). Hooper's humanity hardly seems sinful: he is kind and
well-disposed toward everyone he meets. Although community members tease him, he
ignores their mean-spirited fun. When sinners need help, he ministers to them,
and his ministry is especially effective. The story is largely an account of
Hooper's benevolent service to his congregation, despite their unwillingness to
accept his harmless display of conscience. Nevertheless, there is no explicit
refutation of Hooper's sinful nature available because the sinful nature
conceived of by the Puritans is "not an act but a condition" (Morsberger 458).
Only the strong contrast between the goodness of Hooper and the distrustful
hostility of his community suggests a difference in nature: Hooper's is clearly
the less sinful. Additionally, the consistency in Hooper's actions--especially
his refusal to abandon the veil--suggests rejection of the Puritan belief in
theological fatalism. Hooper does not search for deliverance from his sorrows;
instead he resolves to live his life as best he can while dealing with them, a
stance that leaves no room for unpredictable deliverance from God. The strongest
reasons for evaluating Hooper according to moderate determinism are the
behaviors Hooper exhibits that clearly suggest he considers himself only
partially determined. Having shown that Hooper cannot be properly interpreted in
roles that absolve him of moral responsibility, such as antichrist, embodiment
of pride, and representative of sinful nature, moderate determinism appears the
most suitable premise to use in ascertaining the morality of his wearing the
veil. Such an assessment would contrast his performance as a minister with his
potential as a minister in order to determine whether wearing the veil
significantly affects his effectiveness.
Like Hawthorne's Goodman Brown and Reverend Hooper, Crane's characters
are best evaluated from the perspective of moderate determinism. Crane presents
several characters in Maggie's community and family that behave poorly, and
would seem conditioned to do so, if it were not for insights from Crane's
narrator that reveal otherwise. Crane uses narration to show that social and
biological conditioning have not diminished characters' capacities to defy their
violent, unpleasant environments. The tenement environment in which Maggie grows
up is itself the subject of narration that reveals the community's failure to
develop its potential. The first sentence of the novella suggests a radical
contrast between the environment in which Jimmie is playing and the "honor" that
he supposedly defends: "A very little
boy stood upon a heap of gravel for the honor of Rum Alley" (7). Donald Pizer
comments on this disparity: "The sentence introduces both Crane's theme and his
ironic technique. By juxtaposing the value of honor and the reality of a very
little boy, a heap of gravel, and Rum Alley, Crane suggests that the idea of
honor is inappropriate to the reality, that it serves to disguise from the
participants in the fight that they are engaged in a vicious and petty scuffle"
(169). Through the details provided in the narration, Crane exposes the lack of
Run Alley's honor, as well as the possibility that it may have had honor, but
the reality proves otherwise. This combination of insights demonstrates
alternative courses of moral action that the community has chosen between--to be
honorable, or not. If Crane were a severe determinist whose opinion of human
will resembled that of a nihilist, he would not have drawn the reader's
attention to such a choice because he would not have believed such a choice
existed.
In addition to describing the environment of her home, the narration also
reveals that Maggie's mother and brother each choose between moral alternatives
in order to callously shame Maggie.
Mary Johnson, Maggie's mother, is violent and destructive, not because of some
genetic disposition or social condition, but because she is dissatisfied with
her life: "It seems that the world had treated this woman very badly, and she
took a deep revenge upon such portions of it as came within her reach. She broke
furniture as if she were at last getting her rights" (33). Mary feels entitled
to a quality of life that she does not enjoy. Her rage and vicious habits are
motivated not only by alcoholism she may have inherited from her parents, but
also from her own poor view of life. She could choose to think differently, as
the narrator says that it only "seems" as though the world had treated her
badly, but Mary has chosen to feel worse than she must. Having been given a set
of alternatives, she chooses the less virtuous course of action. Similarly,
Jimmie also chooses vice when confronted with an opportunity to defend his
sister. He witnesses Maggie's expulsion from home and realizes that she may not
be entirely at fault, yet says nothing: "Of course Jimmie publically damned his
sister that he might appear on a higher social plane. But, arguing with himself,
stumbling about in ways that he knew not, he, once, almost came to a conclusion
that his sister would have been more firmly good had she better known why.
However, he felt that he could not hold such a view" (52). The reader knows that
Jimmie knew within himself that Maggie was not responsible for her behavior.
Nevertheless, despite having the ability to come to her aid, Jimmie chooses to
allow her to be condemned by his mother and community. The narrator emphasizes
the personal gain, apparent moral superiority, that Jimmie enjoys from doing so.
Both Maggie's mother and her brother choose unethical courses of action for
reasons that the narrator reveals to have nothing to do with social or
biological predispositions. In each case, a family member could have exercised
his or her free will to make a better moral choice, but intentionally declined
to do so.
The narrator not only reveals that Maggie's environment and family
deliberately fail to help her, but also that a clergyperson rejects her plea for
help despite knowing her need. The clergyman appears approachable: "His beaming,
chubby face was a picture of benevolence and kind-heartedness. His eyes shone
good-will" (64). However, when Maggie tries to approach for help, "he gave a
convulsive movement and saved his respectability by a vigorous sidestep" (64).
The description of his movement as "convulsive" suggests an involuntary
reaction, but the narrator associates it with an artificial, social motive,
respectability. Moreover, the narrator explains the thoughts that motivate the
clergyman's choice of a less virtuous alternative to helping Maggie: "For how
was he to know that there was a soul before him that needed saving?" (64).
Although this question pretends ignorance, the clergyman is clearly not ignorant
of the condition of Maggie. He considers her company unrespectable, but for
self-serving motives, assumes that she is not in need of help. This disingenuous
reasoning is self-justifying, but it proves that the clergyman is aware of his
choice to ignore Maggie. In his moment of decision, he evaluated the alternative
courses of action, and chose that which would save his reputation. This was not
caused by any miscommunication between the different classes the clergyman and
Maggie occupy; it is only the clergyman's desire to maintain his reputation that
motivates his rejection. The narrator contrasts the false ignorance of the
clergyman with the genuine ignorance of Maggie: the former is the clergyman's
excuse for failing to assist the despondent Maggie, while the latter is the
cause of Maggie's despondency. Maggie's ignorance is not the only cause of her
demise; the feigned ignorance of her family and the community members supposedly
dedicated to helping others is also responsible.
Both Nathaniel Hawthorne and Stephen Crane demonstrate their commitment
to moderate determinism, instead of the theological fatalism and moral nihilism
with which they are usually associated. In Nathaniel Hawthorne's "Young Goodman
Brown" and "The Minister's Black Veil" Goodman Brown and Reverend Hooper are
presented with moments of decision in which they must choose between courses of
moral action; their choices are partially determined by their relationships to
external factors, but they are also partially free. Goodman Brown's perceptions
of his environment and relationship to humanity do not diminish his
responsibility for his actions in the witches' meeting, and Reverend Hooper
resists being read in roles that assume he is severely determined and unable to
make genuine choices. In Stephen Crane's
Maggie: A Girl of the Streets, the narrator reveals that characters in
Maggie's community and family are not completely determined by their social and
biological conditions. Each has moments of decision in which they choose between
possible moral actions, and most choose poorly, contributing to Maggie's demise.
Despite belonging to different genres, Hawthorne and Crane both affirm the
reality of limited free will. This means that their worldviews are fundamentally
compatible in terms of moral agency.
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