[9.1] A firm Union will be of the utmost moment [importance] to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection [rebellion]. It is impossible to read the history of the petty [small] republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are to succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity [happiness] open to view, we behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. . . .

[9.2] From the disorders that disfigure the annals [historical records] of those republics the advocates of despotism [tyranny or authoritarian government] have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty [human rights]. They have decried all free government as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics [awesome structures or frameworks] reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy sophisms [flawed arguments]. And, I trust, America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices [constructions], not less magnificent, which will be equally permanent monuments of their [sophists’] errors.

[9.3] But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched of republican government were too just copies [painfully accurate accounts] of the originals [actual histories] from which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that species of government [a republic] as indefensible. The science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients. [<Enlightenment principles aren’t utopian or perfectionist, but they do admit the possibility of progress; classical models are meant to be improved on, not slavishly copied.] The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the new Constitution; I mean the enlargement of the orbit within which such systems are to revolve, [<astronomical metaphor; cf. Thomas Paine, The Age of Reason] either in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy. . . .

[9.4] The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction [division] and to guard the internal tranquility of States, as to increase their external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu [French political thinker, 1689-1755] on the necessity of a contracted [limited] territory for a republican government. But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that great man expressed in another part of his work . . . .

[9.5] When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched nurseries of unceasing discord [strife], and the miserable objects of universal pity or contempt. . . .

[9.6] A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised between a confederacy and a consolidation of the States. The essential characteristic of the first [confederacy] is said to be, the restriction of its authority to the members in their collective capacities, without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with any object of internal administration. An exact equality of suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a leading feature of a confederate government. [<as in the pre-1900s U.S. Senate] . . .

[9.7] The definition of a confederate republic seems simply to be "an assemblage of societies,'' or an association of two or more states into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long as it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes; though it should be in perfect subordination to the general authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution, so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their possession certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power. [<retention of “states’ rights” in federal union]  This fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government. . . .

PUBLIUS.

Hamilton, award-winning 2014-16 musical
based on 2004 biography Alexander Hamilton by Ron Chernow

Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804), first secretary of Treasury