[6.1]  . . . A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests [controversies, combats] with each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. [Enlightenment skepticism re human motives] To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages. [Enlightenment appeal to empirical and historical evidence; Hamilton goes on to review examples from classical Greece and Renaissance Europe, particularly the personal causes that motivate monarchies to war.] . . .

[6.2] To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time. . . . Perhaps, however, a reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among ourselves. If Shays had not been a desperate debtor, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war. [<Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts 1786-7, rising from bankruptcies caused by debts from Revolutionary War]

[6.3] But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing men [cf. “Utopian speculations” above, 6.1], who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.

[6.4] [<after stating his opponents case, Hamilton queries it as in a Socratic dialogue>] Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former administered by men as well as the latter? . . . Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of [lust for] territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer to these inquiries. [<Enlightenment appeal to empiricism or experience + historical record>]

[6.5] Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring monarchies of the same times. . . . [more examples follow from classical and modern history] . . .

[6.6] In the government of Britain the representatives of the people [like a republic] compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people.

[6.7] There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation [its people] and the importunities [insistent demands] of their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the State. . . .

[6.8] The wars of these two last-mentioned nations [Austria & Bourbon France] have in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation.

[6.9] From this summary of what has taken place in other countries, whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries [cf. “Utopian speculations,” 6.1] which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age [Enlightenment reaction against imagination over reason], and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue? [human perfectability is not part of the Enlightenment or the Constitution (which advances "a more perfect union" but not a "perfect union." Rather, the Enlightenment & the Constitution admit human imperfection and irrationality, and attempt to restrain or balance such qualities against humanity's virtues.] . . .

PUBLIUS. [Alexander Hamilton]