James Johnson
April 17, 2002 

                                                Amundsen and Scott Revisited 

         Prior to this class my knowledge of Antarctic exploration was very limited.  I knew that Amundsen had reached the South Pole first and that Scott had reached the South Pole but died during the return trip.  I also knew that Scott was considered a hero for what he had done.  The Antarctic exploration literature reading assignments associated with this class greatly increased my knowledge related to the Terra Nova expedition led by Scott but raised other unanswered questions.  In addition to the class reading assignments and discussion, the research for my mid-term research paper focused primarily on The Last Place on Earth by Roland Huntford and Scott’s Antarctic journals, as they were published in Scott of the Antarctic by Reginald Pound. 

         In The Last Place on Earth, Huntford covers the lives of Amundsen and Scott from their births to their deaths.  His work provides insights into the Amundsen and Scott families as well as the education and interests of Amundsen and Scott.  The book contrasts the experiences and capabilities of Amundsen and Scott relative to their exploration activities and also provides some insight into what motivated them.  The book also points out very effectively the poor quality of Scott’s planning and preparation for the Terra Nova expedition and the errors in judgment by Scott that ultimately led to the death of Scott, Evans, Wilson, Bowers and Oates.  The Huntford book was denigrated by the Scott family and the British in general as a biased and blatant attempt to discredit Scott.  For the most part the literary community, which has generated many works based on the heroic tragedy of the Terra Nova expedition, has generally ignored the Huntford book.  I found the Huntford book to be very credible and informative.  It addressed questions that came to my mind after I had read the class assignments and also identified literary issues such as the alteration of Scott’s diaries in their published form, that had not surfaced as a part of our assigned readings or class discussion. 

         After completion of my mid-term research paper my opinion concerning Scott’s heroic legacy had changed based on what I had read in the Huntford book.  I no longer viewed Scott as a heroic figure but I felt I needed additional sources of corroborating information in order to feel truly confident about the information and opinions provided by the Huntford book.  Scott and his Terra Nova exploration team were relatively well educated men.  I felt some of the mistakes that were made by the Scott expedition should have been readily apparent to the expedition team.  I wanted to obtain the views of other Terra Nova team members relative to the planning and execution of the expedition in order to assess their thoughts and also to determine whether their views were consistent with the information provided in Huntford’s book.  I also wanted to better understand what motivated these men.  Another question I wanted to explore was, “Would Scott’s polar team have survived if Amundsen had not been a factor?”  The method I selected to try to gain these insights was to obtain and study unmodified versions of the diaries, journals and letters of Terra Nova team members.  Information obtained from the study of these journals and associated writings in conjunction with information previously obtained during the preparation of my mid-term research paper provided the basis for my assessments and conclusions presented in this research paper.

         For my research material I was able to obtain Diary of the Terra Nova Expedition to the Antarctic 1910-1912, Scott’s Last Voyage Through the Antarctic Camera of Herbert Ponting,  The Worst Journey in the World, Tragedy and Triumph The Journals of Captain R. F. Scott’s Last Polar Expedition, and Captain Oates  Soldier and Explorer.   While reading the research material I was initially concerned and disappointed.  Edward Wilson was so focused on his scientific role that his diaries essentially revealed nothing more than his scientific observations on weather and wildlife.  Herbert Ponting’s book contained only superficial general information on the expedition and was essentially a collection of his photographs.  Apsley Cherry-Garrard’s book was written a decade after the expedition and contained scattered excerpts from his actual diary and the diaries of some of the other team members including Priestley, Scott, Bowers, Lashly, Wilson and possibly others that I failed to note.  In attempting to utilize Cherry-Garrard’s book for research some problems ensued.  Because the book contained a mixture of excerpts from different diaries, it was difficult to keep track of the sources for the information in the texts.  There was also a discrepancy that I found there that I could not resolve.  Cherry-Garrard’s book attributes the loss of the hypsometer to Lashly on December 26, 1911 (page 432).  In the Tragedy and Triumph version of Scott’s diary the loss of the hypsometer is attributed to Bowers on December 27, 1911.  It is possible that the discrepancy with regard to who broke the hypsometer may be simply my inability to follow which diary is being quoted in Cherry-Garrard’s book.   The one day date discrepancy may be the result of a one day delay in Scott becoming aware of the loss of the hypsometer.  This is not an attempt to cast any negative aspersions on Cherry-Garrard’s book.  His book provides a broader view of Scott’s expedition

than probably any of the others I have read.  The brevity and mixture of diary excerpts however did not allow me to obtain additional insights into other expedition team members beyond what I already had from other readings.  The Tragedy and Triumph version of Scott’s diaries appeared to be complete but provided no significant revelations beyond those I had already previously obtained from Huntford’s book. The book on Titus Oates was a biography published seventy years after the expedition and contained only a few excerpts from Oates’ diary and references from Oates’ letters to his mother.  After contemplating everything I had read however I realized that clues to the information I was seeking were there.  They had just not initially been obvious to me. 

         I will begin with an analysis of the underlying motivation of the key participants in the expeditions.   The motivating factors for Scott and Amundsen go back to their earlier years.  There were actually a couple of similarities in the social structure of the Amundsen and Scott families.  Both were upper middle class families with a modest amount of money and ties to the sea.  Neither Amundsen nor Scott was an only child.  Both men also were seeking to gain fame by being the first to lead an expedition to the South Pole.  The similarities pretty much ended there however.

         Scott’s family had a British Royal Navy tradition.  The Scott family’s money had largely come from his grandfather, Robert Scott, who had served as a Royal Navy purser during the Napoleonic Wars.  Scott’s father, John Edward Scott, ran a brewery that he had inherited from his father.  When Robert Falcon Scott was born he was named after his grandfather.  John Scott decided at an early age that his son Robert’s profession would be an officer in the Royal Navy.   He was sent to a naval prep school and at age thirteen became a naval training cadet at Dartmouth.  Two years later he graduated as a midshipman and when to sea.  After four years at

sea he was promoted to sub-lieutenant.  He attended the Royal Naval College for a year in order to more quickly qualify as a lieutenant.  Scott was very ambitious and anxious to achieve recognition and promotion.  Torpedoes were the latest technology so he applied for training as a torpedo specialist in order to improve his chances for promotion.  At that time Scott had no interest in polar exploration but as time passed and his career seemed to be stalled he heard about the planned British Antarctic Expedition.  Scott saw command of this expedition as his chance for immediate promotion and, if successful, a reputation that would insure his future ascent to high rank.  He went to Sir Clements Markham’s house twice in the course of two weeks to ask for command of the expedition.   Scott was not Markham’s first choice for the command but his first choice had recently disgraced himself due to drinking and since there were no other volunteers Scott eventually got the command (Huntford pages 118-137).   Scott’s passion was not for exploration.  His passion was the advancement of his career in the Royal Navy. 

         After completing my mid-term research I considered Scott to be an anachronism.  His attitudes and exploration methods seemed outdated and misguided.  After doing my further research on Scott and his men my opinion has changed.  It was not Scott or his men as individuals that were anachronistic.  They were part of a country that at the end of the nineteenth century, had become an anachronism.  Scott’s team members, that I have been able to research, possessed widely differing personalities and capabilities but they had something in common with Scott.  They were Englishmen and patriots in the truest sense.  They all believed in England and the attitudes and traditions that had made their country the greatest colonial power in the world.  As English gentlemen they believed that how they lived was more important than how long they lived.  Their honor and devotion to duty and country were more important to them than life itself.  They were going to Antarctica to test and prove themselves as true Englishmen.   Their desire for physical testing is expressed very effectively by Sue Limb and Patrick Cordingley in the following excerpt (page 256) from Captain Oates Soldier and Explorer:  “Physical endurance was highly valued for its own sake, because it proved manhood, and beyond that, there was a belief that stoicism ennobled the spirit, too:  in the crucible of suffering the pure gold of honour would appear.  Antarctica was the perfect setting for such exertions.” 

         There was one major difference however between Scott and his men.  Scott’s men were there as patriots and to test themselves and prove their mettle primarily for themselves and possibly their families and friends and to some extent for the adventure of exploring.  In addition to the patriotism and testing and proving himself, Scott was also seeking the fame that would be his if he succeeded.  The fame, and the social status that would come with it, would provide a tremendous boost to fulfilling his career ambitions. 

         Roald Amundsen’s father was the owner and captain of a trading ship so Roald was exposed to the seafaring life at a very early age.  Living in Norway he also practically grew up on skis.  It was the perfect set of circumstances for a future Arctic or Antarctic explorer.  It was only natural that Amundsen’s biggest hero was Fridtjof Nansen.  Even as a youth Amundsen had a passion for exploration, making ski trips across uncharted backcountry areas in Norway. Amundson’s family wanted him to become a doctor but it was not a field that he was interested in or particularly well suited to.  Education was never of great interest to Amundsen.  He earned his student’s cap (basically equivalent to a high school diploma) and enrolled in medical studies at Christiania University to satisfy his mother but he would never complete his studies as a doctor (Huntsford pages 27 – 39).  His interest at the time was in Artic exploration.  Like Scott, Amundsen wanted to achieve fame as an explorer however his desire for fame had less to do with social status.  He needed the fame in order to obtain financial backing for his future exploration ventures.

         I believe the difference in the underlying motivation of the leaders, was one of the factors related to the eventual success or failure of the respective expedition teams.  Amundsen’s passion for exploration made him highly interested in all aspects of exploration history, technology and any skills and activities related to exploration.  He had studied and experienced virtually every aspect of Polar exploration.  As a result, when Amundsen went to Antarctica for his attempt to reach the South Pole, he had done almost everything possible to insure his success. Scott like Amundsen had previous Polar exploration experience but because he lacked the passionate interest in exploration that Amundsen possessed, he did not learn nearly as much from that experience and did not spend the time between expeditions improving his Polar exploration knowledge, skills and technology.  Scott was misled by his belief that established British exploration ideas, traditions, and technology were automatically superior.  As a result when Scott headed to Antarctica for the Terra Nova expedition his chances for success were not dramatically improved beyond what his chances had been on his former Discovery expedition.

         My attempt to find additional data through my new research to either corroborate or refute what I had previously found in Huntford’s book was not as successful as what I was expecting.  I found nothing that contradicted the information in Huntford’s book but I also did not find many obvious complaints by Scott’s men to reinforce Huntford’s negative assessment of Scott’s capabilities.  I did find a couple of additional controversies however that might be worth mentioning.  After setting up One Ton Depot on the depot laying trip, Oates suggested to Scott that they kill the weakest horse (Weary Willie) and deposit him as part of One Ton Depot and then take the remaining horses as far south as possible and kill them in order to set up another depot south of One Ton Depot.  “I have had more than enough of this cruelty to animals,” was Scott’s reply, “and I’m not going to defy my feelings for the sake of a few days’ march.”  “I’m afraid you’ll regret, it, sir,” said Oates in the end.  “Regret it or not, my dear Oates,” Scott answered, “I’ve made up my mind like a Christian” (Limb and Cordingley pages 313, 324 and 325).  This exchange illustrates the depth of Scott’s aversion to any type of cruelty to animals and unfortunately the concerns expressed by Oates ended up being all too prophetic.  Scott wanted to have the horses return to Cape Evans rather than have to kill them.  Scott chose to return to Cape Evans with the dog teams.  It took Oates, Bowers and Gran with the horse teams over twice as long to return.  It was a long and difficult trip.  Only one of the five remaining horses survived the trip and the problems on the ice floes (Tragedy and Triumph 138-154).  The other four horses, which could have been in a life saving depot farther south, ended up just being wasted.  The second controversy was minor but indicated Scott’s decisions concerning their planned mode of transport were the subject of ridicule for some expedition members.  While working together, Meares tells Oates that Scott should have spent a shilling for a book on transport.  Scott overheard the remark and was obviously displeased (Limb and Cordingley 366).

         Though not providing a wealth of insight from expedition members, my research did allow me to come to some new conclusions regarding some of the aspects of Scott’s expedition.  The first new conclusion I will discuss is related to Scott’s decisions after reading the report from Campbell’s group detailing their observations from the time they spent at Amundsen’s base in the Bay of Whales.  At this point in the expedition Scott has just finished his depot laying.  On his previous Discovery expedition his experience with dog teams had been totally negative.  The dog teams they had on the Discovery expedition were malnourished and were not good quality dogs.  They also did not have properly trained dog team drivers on the expedition so the dog teams on the Discovery expedition were virtually useless (Huntford 167-169). 

         During the depot laying trip Scott and his expedition team are exposed to the advantages of using better quality dog teams.  Wilson was not a big fan of the dogs but his recognition of the virtues of the dogs in contrast with the horses is made apparent in a couple of entries from Wilson’s diary made during the depot laying journey.  On Thursday, February 2, 1911 in his Diary of the Terra Nova Expedition to the Antarctic 1910-1912, Wilson writes, “The horses all went first. Scott and Teddie Evans leading the two that Atkinson and Craen had been leading.  Meares and I followed in two hours with our dog teams and caught the horse party up by lunchtime having done about 5 miles (102).  A few days later on Monday, February 6, 1911 during a blizzard Wilson writes, “Lying up all day.  Warm and wet.  Temperature +20 to +24 degrees F… The horses have been looking very wretched in this snowstorm and the dogs have been buried again and again.  Wind force 6 to 7.  The dogs are quite happy and the only trouble they give is from twisting their harness into knots by turning round and round every time they get up before lying down again”(102).  On the depot laying trip Scott has learned the dog teams are so much faster than his horse teams he has to delay the start of the dog teams by an hour or two every time they start in order for them to be together with the horse teams whenever they stop to eat or sleep.  The dog teams also withstand the weather much better than the horses.  He has begun to realize his previous assessment of the capabilities of the dog teams was incorrect.  When the report from Campbell’s group subsequently tells Scott how fast and disciplined Amundsen’s dog teams performed while they were visiting Amundsen at the Bay of Whales, Scott knows his goal of being the first to the South Poles is in very serious jeopardy.  After receiving the report about the Norwegians at the Bay of Whales Scott announces to his team that they will not change any of their plans in order to engage in a race to the Pole with Amundsen’s team.  When I initially read this I perceived this to simply be another example of Scott’s inflexibility.  Now however I believe that Scott knew the only way he would be the first to the Pole was if some major disaster occurred to Amundsen’s team.  He knows that using dog teams Amundsen will be able to start for the Pole much earlier because his dogs can stand the early season cold weather much better than Scott’s horses.  He knows even his own dog teams are faster than his horse teams and they are even faster still than his man-hauling teams will be.  He also knows Amundsen’s dog teams are probably even faster than his dog teams.  Scott only has thirty dogs.  That is not enough to make it to the Pole with dogs even if he wanted to attempt it.   The Terra Nova has already left.  There is no possibility of obtaining additional dogs in time for the trip to the Pole the next spring.  Scott really didn’t have any other viable options.  If Scott refused to commit to a race with Amundsen to the Pole and instead stuck to his original expedition plan and continued to emphasize the scientific aspects of his expedition, he would still be able to claim that his expedition had succeeded as planned, even if they were not the first to reach the Pole.  Based on the report from Campbell’s group Scott thought there was still a good chance that Amundsen’s team would have serious problems.  The report erroneously indicated Amundsen’s base was located on sea ice in the Bay of Whales that would most likely break up during the approaching summer months (The Worst Journey in the World 177).  If the ice break-up or some other catastrophe stopped Amundsen’s team – so much the better, Scott would be the first to the Pole even if he stuck to his original plan.  If no catastrophe intervened, there was nothing that Scott could change that would allow his team to beat Amundsen’s team to the Pole so sticking to his original plan would still be his best option.

         The second conclusion I was able to draw from my additional research is related to the psychological impacts on Scott’s team from equipment and weather issues combined with finding that Amundsen’s team has beaten them to the Pole.  I found additional information during my research for this paper that is consistent with what Sir Charles Wright had told Charles Neider in his interview.  Neider asked, “Sir Charles, when you were going up the Beardmore with the rest of the group you must have been very much aware of the possibility of Amundsen’s having reached the Pole.”  Sir Charles Wright’s reply was, “No.  I don’t think anybody – I don’t know how it came about but I don’t think anybody had the idea that Amundsen would take a different route from the Beardmore.  Once we reached the top of the Beardmore and had seen no signs of him we thought some catastrophe had happened (Edge of the World 286).  Priestley’s diary also indicates that the Scott team expected Amundsen to use the Beardmore route to the Polar plateau. While writing about his observations at Amundsen’s camp at the Bay of Whales he writes, “There remains the Beardmore Glacier.  Can their dogs face it and if so, who will get there first.”(Cherry-Garrard 176).  An excerpt from Scott’s diary would also appear to support this view.  On January 5, 1912 at the top of the Beardmore Scott wrote, “What lots of things we think of on these monotonous marches!  What castles one builds now hopefully that the Pole is ours.  Bowers took sights to-day and will take them every third day.  We feel the cold very little,” (Tragedy and Triumph 414).  They had reached the top of the Beardmore with no sign of Amundsen and it appears that Scott is very confident that they will now reach the Pole first.  This supports what Wright told Neider in his interview.  Cherry-Garrard states in his book, “Scott, Wilson, Oates, Bowers were not unduly depressed to find that Amundsen had forestalled them at the Pole, though naturally they were disappointed (Wilson perhaps not even that).  But Evans was really disheartened:  he began to go downhill from then on” (24).  I realize it is rather presumptuous to suggest that a few pieces of information gathered from my research should be considered by me to be possibly more plausable than the opinion of an actual expedition member but I do not agree with Cherry-Garrard’s assessment of the psychological impact on Scott’s men after they found Amundsen’s team had reached the Pole first.  While reading Wilson’s diary, I noticed that even though they were traveling against the prevailing wind the last few days before reaching the Pole (temperatures the last few days were - January 13 –22 degrees, January 14 –18 degrees, January 15 –25 degrees, January 16 –23 degrees), Wilson had seldom mentioned the cold while they were striving to get to the Pole.  January 17, the day they found the Norwegian flag, Wilson writes, “It blew force 4-6 all day in our teeth with temp. –22 degrees, the coldest march I ever made.”  After that day even though the temperature stays in the minus twenties range and they have the wind at their backs, the cold is mentioned every day in Wilson’s diary entries through January 20 (Wilson 231-237).  I believe this was related to the psychological effect of finding the Norwegians had been to the Pole first.  I think another factor bothering Scott was the loss of some of his instruments.  The loss of those instruments would have caused him to be concerned about the validity of their scientific data.  That data was now more important than ever because it would be their only claim to fame.  They had already lost their hypsometer which meant they couldn’t calibrate their aneroid barometers for taking barometric pressure readings and also meant they could not measure their altitude accurately.  On January 9 they had also found that their chronometers were no longer synchronized.  Wilson wrote in his diary, “At this morning’s breakfast a sad discrepancy of 26 minutes was discovered between the only two watches.  Question is which has gone wrong.” (230).  This is a very serious problem because without accurate chronometer readings they could not ascertain their exact location nor could they determine the precise location of the Pole.  It is strange that they would only have two chronometers.  Three are really a minimum.  With two, when a discrepancy occurs, all you really know is that you have a problem.  You don’t have any way to correct it.  With these problems Scott would not be able to provide accurate scientific data when he returned to England.  This would have been a major embarrassment for Scott’s team and would have made their scientific superiority claims look ridiculous.

         At this point, after my additional research, there is one other question that begs for an answer:  “Would Scott’s team have survived if they had been the first to reach the Pole”?   In my opinion the two most critical mistakes made by the Scott expedition were not using dog teams for transport and not properly marking their trail.  Every returning party, including Scott’s Pole team, lost the trail and ran into major problem areas coming down the Beardmore.  For Scott’s Pole team I also believe the mental aspect was a major factor.  Of course it is pure conjecture on my part but in spite of their mistakes, I believe everyone but Evans would probably have survived if Scott’s team had been the first to the Pole.  I don’t believe Scott would have let anything stop him.  I believe they would have had the mental stamina to push through to One Ton Depot and I think they would have put Oates on the sledge and carried him as Lashly and Craen had done with Edgar Evans on their return trip (Cherry-Garrard 457-459).  

         After all of my additional research, I find my views have not substantially changed.  I have gained even more respect for the courage and stamina of Scott and his men.  Even more than ever I find Scott’s men earned their place in history as true heroes.  I still believe that Scott should not be touted as a hero.  Nothing I have found absolves him of responsibility for all of his mistakes in planning and executing the expedition.  The deaths of Edgar Evans, Henry Bowers, Edward Wilson, Lawrence Oates and Scott himself must be attributed to Scott.

 

                                                                  Works Cited

Cherry-Garrard, Apsley.  The Worst Journey in the World:  Antartic 1910-13.  Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1970. 24, 176, 177, 457-459.

Huntford, Roland.  The Last Place on Earth.  New York:  Atheneum, 1985.  27-39, 118-137.

Limb, Sue and Cordingley, Patrick.  Captain Oates :  Soldier and Explorer.  Leicester:          Ulverscroft, 1997.  256, 313, 324, 325.

Neider, Charles.  Edge of the World Ross Island, Antarctica.  Garden City, New York:          Doubleday & Company Inc.  1974.  286.

Ponting, Herbert.  Scott’s Last Voyage:  Through the Antarctic Camera of Herbert Ponting.  Ed. Ann Savours.  New York – Washington:  Praeger Publishers, 1975.

Pound, Reginald.  Scott of the Antarctic.  London:  World Books, 1968. 

Scott, Robert Falcon.  Tragedy and Triumph:  The Journals of Captain R. F. Scott’s Last Polar Expedition.  New York:  Konecky & Konecky,   138-154, 414, 432. 

Wilson, Edward.  Diary of the Terra Nova Expedition to the Antarctic 1910-1912.  Ed. H. G. R. King.  New York:  Humanities Press, 1972.  102, 230-237.