James Johnson

February 23, 2002

                Amundsen versus Scott:  Why is Scott Considered a Hero?

          Most people are familiar with the tragic story of the expedition to the South Pole led by Robert Scott.  Few people know as much about the expedition, led by Roald Amundsen,  that beat the Scott expedition to the South Pole.  After reading about Scott’s expedition, I wanted to try to better understand why Amundsen has remained a relatively unknown and unsympathetic figure in the history of Antarctic exploration.  The simple explanation, based on our readings and class discussion, was that the writing skills and subsequent literary works by the members of the Scott expedition were far superior to those of the members of the Amundsen expedition and the tremendous hardships and tragic ending of the Scott expedition provided the basis for a much more dramatic story.  After the readings and discussion however, I felt there must be other factors that, even today, contribute to the disparity in the way these expeditions are treated by history and by the literary works that have subsequently been written about these expeditions. 

          The works of literature on Polar exploration that we have read as a part of this class are a direct reflection of what I have just alluded to.    Several of our assigned primary and secondary readings were associated with the Scott expedition.  The primary readings associated with the Scott expedition included from Ice:  the essay “A Bad Time”, the excerpt from “The Worst Journey in the World”, the excerpt from “Scott’s Last Expedition:  The Journals”, the excerpt from “The Birthday Boys”, the excerpt from “Beyond Cape Horn”, the excerpt from “I May Be Some Time”.  The secondary readings associated with the Scott expedition included “A Magnificent Failure”, “The Southern End of the Earth:  Antarctic Literature”, and “Ice Capades”.  The only one of these works that covered, even briefly, the Amundsen expedition to the South Pole was “Ice Capades”.  “The Southern End of the Earth:  Antarctic Literature” provides an excellent illustration of the disparity in terms of the literary treatment of the two expeditions.  The article refers to, “the rich literature written by Heroic Age Antarctic explorers (1899-1917) with names like Roald Amundsen, Robert Falcon Scott, Earnest Shackleton, and Douglas Mawson, and by others that accompanied them”, but does not identify, in the article or in the “Selected Works and Further Reading” section at the end, any literature written by Amundsen or anyone who accompanied him nor does it identify any literature on Amundsen’s expedition to the South Pole written by anyone else.

          One of the things that caught my attention while reading about the Scott expedition was the absurdity of man-hauling sledges in the Polar environment.  The practice of sledge hauling with dog teams was the normal mode of transportation in all of the inhabited polar-type environments during that period.  It raised questions in my mind about Scott’s competence as the leader of the expedition and made me curious to find out why he would 

resort to that method of transport.  It also made me want to find out more about Amundsen in order to make a better comparison of the two men.  Fortunately for me at this time you brought the book, The Last Place on Earth, to class and it proved to be an excellent source of information relative to both expeditions and the only extensive source I have been able to read on Amundsen. 

          Prior to their respective expeditions to reach the South Pole, Amundsen and Scott had each been on a previous Antarctic expedition.  Scott had achieved a measure of fame by leading the Discovery expedition (1901-1904) to the Antarctic and Amundsen had served as second officer on the Belgica expedition (1897-1899) to the Antarctic led by Dr. Fredrick Cook.  Amundsen had also achieved some fame by leading the Northwest Passage expedition in the Canadian Arctic.

          The contrast between what each man learned from his previous experience was remarkable.  In The Last Place on Earth, Roland Huntford indicates that Amundsen learns the design of the tent they are using presents too great a surface to the wind.  It should instead be conical in shape and made of different material.  He also learns: sealskin clothes are very practical because they are lighter and dry more easily, waterproof tin should be used for storing matches, snow goggles are an absolute necessity and to go alone in Antarctica is madness; two people roped together is a necessity (68).  Amundsen also learns another very important lesson; fresh meat will prevent scurvy (Huntford 72).  Huntford also writes, “Amundsen looked on his surroundings as a school for Polar exploration to teach him lessons for the future.  While those around him were going through their little private hells, he was dispassionately recording what he learned.  At the worst moments, even when Belgica is threatened with destruction by the ice, they are preparing to abandon ship and prospects are exceptionally bleak, he is learning, always learning” (71).  On his Nothwest Passage expedition, Amundsen adds to the knowledge he gained on the Belgica expedition by learning how to drive and handle dog teams, how to coat sled runners with ice to run efficiently in cold snow, how to build igloos, and how to properly wear fur clothes (Huntford 100-110). 

          In contrast, Huntford sums up what Scott learned from the Discovery expedition, “The trouble was that even after the Discovery expedition, Scott had never come to terms with the Polar environment.

          The ponies alone, totally unsuited to the conditions, fighting their way into the drift, their nearest food growing 2,000 miles away, bear witness to Scott’s inability to grasp the implications of the cold, storms and unpredictable surfaces of the Antarctic world.  Perhaps he lacked the competence, the application, even possibly the intelligence to carry technical aids through to success.

          For at least four years he had known he would return to the Antarctic.  He could have visited Norway or the Alps; learnt to ski and drive dogs himself; acquired a grounding in the internal combustion engine, (he was, after all, a torpedo expert), or even tried some mountaineering.  He had done none of these things.

          Incompetent design penetrated into most details of equipment.  Scott had learned nothing and forgotten nothing.  He still used neither furs nor anoraks, but wore the same inefficient garments with separate hoods that had disfigured the Discovery expedition.  His tents, without sewn-in groundsheets, slipped over a cumbersome framework of poles, like a tepee, were difficult to erect in a gale.  And where transport was concerned, Scott trusted neither ponies, nor skis, dogs or sledge; in truth all he really believed in was human effort” (393).  Scott’s thoughts concerning the use of dogs are revealed in Reginald Pound’s Scott of the Antarctic, after having problems driving his dog teams on the Discovery expedition Scott writes, “No journey ever made with dogs can approach the height of that fine conception which is realized when a party of men go forth to meet hardships, dangers, and difficulties with their own unaided efforts, and by days and weeks of hard physical labour succeed in solving some problems of the great unknown” (77).

          Another very illustrative contrast, between the two expeditions, was the way they spent their time traveling at sea.  Huntford indicates the Amundsen group spends their sea time reworking their boots, rebuilding the sledges to reduce weight, making loose runners for the sledges to guard against wear and to coat with ice for running in cold powder snow conditions, and constructing a non-magnetic steering sledge with no metal parts for mounting their primary steering compass.  Amundsen also has specially sealed metal fuel tanks made for the sledge journeys in order to prevent fuel evaporation.  He does not trust his fuel to regular commercially available fuel tanks (290-291).  In contrast, “Scott’s Last Expedition” in Ice, indicates lack of fuel (due to evaporation) turns out to probably be the difference between life and death for Scott’s South Pole team (109-113).

          Supply depot marking further illustrates the differences in planning between the two leaders.  According to Huntford, during the first Antarctic summer, when Amundsen sets up his supply depots, he marks them with an East/West line of black pennants on sticks set half a mile apart; ten on either side of the depot, making a transverse marking of ten miles across the track.  The distance and direction to the depot from each location is marked on each pennant.  There are no transverse markers for Scott’s supply depots.  He must find his depots with no East/West margin for error greater than his visible line of sight on the day that he reaches the depot.     

          Scott and Amundsen each set up their first supply depot at 80 degrees.  After setting up his depot at 80 degrees, Scott stops for the winter.  Before stopping for the winter Amundsen sets up two additional depots, one at 81 degrees and another at 82 degrees.  Amundsen also deposits a sledge at the 82 degree depot and a ton of seal meat for his dogs at his 80 degree depot (330-334).

          During the Antarctic winter Amundsen’s team applies what they have learned while setting up their depots.  They modify their sledges again to reduce weight, set up a ski shop to build and repair skis so there will be two pairs for each man, one to wear and a spare pair to be carried on the sledge, they modify their boots again (they would modify them a total of four times before setting out for the Pole), they sew their two man tents into a five man tent, with a sewn in floor, that weighs four kilos less and can be erected from the inside, they reduce the weight of their cooking equipment from thirty kilos down to five kilos, they modify their sledge packing cases to make them lighter and to allow the contents to be accessed without unloading them from the sledge (Huntford 337-338).  Due to his experience on the Belgica, Amundsen also insists on a diet of fresh or deep frozen seal meat supplemented with whortleberries and cloudberries in order to prevent scurvy (Huntford 362).

          According to Huntford, “The all-pervading sense of urgency at Framheim” (Amundsen’s winter base camp) “was little in evidence at Cape Evans” (Scott’s winter base camp).  “Winter passed in leisurely, amateur, almost dilettante fashion, reminiscent of Discovery days.  Volunteers were depended on for chores, so the willing horses were overworked.  Travelling technique was neglected, and Gran,” (their Norwegian skiing expert) “instead of teaching skiing, found himself playing moonlight football” (370).  One would think that the hardships they experienced on the trips they made to set up their 80 degree depot and especially the winter trip to Cape Crozier for the penguin eggs would have shaken them out of their British arrogance relative to the superiority of their equipment and techniques.  Instead these trips contributed nothing to the technical capabilities of the Scott expedition team.  Nothing was done to improve their equipment, training, or transportation techniques.  They were inept at learning from their experience (Huntford 373).  

          When Scott sets out for the South Pole on October 24, 1911 he is already 150 miles behind Amundsen who started on October 20.  He has almost no safety margin in his supplies.  The morale of Scott’s men was already suffering.  Huntford indicates that Oates writes in a letter to his mother before they start their trip to the Pole, “The winter here was wretched, although we got on very well together … I dislike Scott intensely and would chuck the thing if it was not that we are the British expedition and must beat the Norwegians.  Scott has always been very civil to me and I have the reputation of getting on well with him.  But the fact of the matter is he is not straight, it is himself first, the rest nowhere, and when he has got what he can out of you, it is shift for yourself.  

Huntford also indicates that Oates goes on to write, “From what I see I think it would not be too difficult to get to the Pole provided you have proper transport but with the rubbish we have it will be jolly difficult and mean a lot of hard work” (390).  As they start the ascent of the Beardmore Glacier, Scott writes, “Skis are the thing, and here are my tiresome fellow-countrymen too prejudiced to have prepared themselves for the event”.  He is blaming his men for what was in reality his own failure of leadership in training his men (Huntford 433).

          In contrast, the mental state of the Norwegian team is excellent.  Their daily runs are based on the stamina of the dogs and are completed in five or six hours, their camp duties are minimal, their clothing is excellent and they are buoyed by the knowledge that they have a supply margin of over 100% and a well marked supply trail (Huntford 404).  They reach the area of the South Pole on December 15 and leave on December 17 after fixing the location of the South Pole using their instruments (Huntford 459).   They return to Framheim on January 26, 1912.

          According to Neider’s interview with Sir Charles Wright, Scott’s team thought the only navigable route to reach the Polar plateau was via the Beardmore Glacier.  When they reached the glacier and found no trace of Amundsen’s team having been there, they assumed Amundsen had run into difficulties (Edge of the World 286).   Scott’s team reached the area of the South Pole on January 17, 1912.  They were already having supply shortage problems.  When on top of this they found the Norwegian flag at the Pole, the mental blow to Scott and his South Pole team must have been devastating.  Scott’s last minute decision to take a fifth man on to the Pole has cost him all of his narrow supply safety margin.  He now has no margin for error on the trip back.  During the descent of the Beardmore Glacier he has difficulty following his poorly marked supply trail (Huntford 486).   Evans dies on February 16th.  Oates leaves the tent on March 17.  On March 21 they are eleven miles from their 80 degree supply depot.  According to Huntford, Scott’s right foot is now frostbitten and he is now the drag on the group as Oates was previously.  “Wilson and Bowers, in marginally better shape, prepared to set off for the depot and fetch food and fuel.  Something stopped them; it is not clear what” (506).  Having to bear the humiliation of losing the race to the Pole to the Norwegians would have been bad enough.  Scott now knew if he made it                                                                                                                                                                   

back he was facing amputation and he would also have to answer for the deaths of Evans and Oates.  It was more than he could face.  It would be better to die in the tent.  For at least nine days they remained in the tent while their food, fuel and finally their lives ebbed away (Huntford 507).

          After doing the additional research for my paper, the only Scott Expedition heroes that remain for me are the men who died following Scott.  They did what they did because their personal honor and their duty to their country was at stake.  In my mind Scott was too incompetent as a leader to be considered a hero.  The question in my mind more than ever remains:  Why is Robert Scott still considered a hero?  Properly sealed fuel tanks, better tent design, better clothes, ski training, more effective use of dog teams, better trail markings, one more supply depot further South, leaving a loaded sledge at the 80 degree depot, greater supply margin, lighter sledges, taking only four men to the Pole as originally planned, an extra set of skis for Bowers to use - attention to any one of these things would have probably provided the margin needed for Scott and his men to survive.  The Norwegian heritage of Amundsen and the other members of his expedition gave them some natural advantages with respect to Polar exploration.  They had grown up using skis and were much better acclimated to conditions of cold and isolation and I am sure that Scott’s defenders would bring up the old cliché “hindsight is 20-20”.   But since Amundsen managed to cover all of these bases I don’t think expecting Scott to have covered at least one of them is much to ask of a hero.

          So I pose the question again:  Why is Scott a hero?  I believe political considerations in play at the time had a lot to do with it.  Scott was already a hero from his previous Discovery expedition.  Britain didn’t want to face the embarrassment of having one of their new heroes disgraced.  With war looming, a tragic hero was just what the British government needed to provide an example for the boys in uniform.  Even though the British Empire was in decline, there was still a significant amount of British arrogance in play so it was not difficult to convince the British people in general that they had another British hero to celebrate.  Norway had just recently achieved independence from Sweden.  Britain was Norway’s ally in retaining their independence so the Norwegians did not wish to discredit Scott or even celebrate too loudly over Amundsen’s achievements.  Huntford writes, “It was characteristic of Britain at the time that very few asked why Amundsen had succeeded.  The most astonishing manipulations of facts were performed in order to prove the British had not been worsted and, but for a little bad luck, all would have been well” (513).  “From the start, there was tacit agreement to tamper with the record in order to protect his name and conceal uncomfortable facts”.  Huntford goes on to write, “For publication , his

diaries were purged of all passages detracting from a perfect image; particularly those revealing bitterness over Amundsen, criticism of his companions and above all, signs of incompetence”.  When the president of the Royal Geographic Society wanted an enquiry into the disaster he was dissuaded by Admiral Beaumont, who pointed out that no one could “say beforehand where an Enquiry might lead to” (527). 

          From my current perspective I think I understand why the mythical version of Scott was initially perpetrated.  As time goes on the legend that was initially created from altered journals and other sympathetic sources is embellished by other writers because the tragic hero saga is such fertile literary ground.  Writers, including contemporary writers, almost always write about Scott because it simply makes for a better story.  Since this is a literature class the primary function is studying the literature of exploration, not the history.  I do think however, that including some readings from The Last Place on Earth, in order to provide a more balanced historical perspective, would be beneficial.  There are still heroes to write about from the Scott expedition to the South Pole.  I just don’t include Scott as one of them anymore.

 

 

                                                                            Works Cited

Alvarez, A.  “A Magnificent Failure.”  Rev. of The Worst Journey in the World, by Apsley Cherry-Gerrard.  The New York Review.

          “Ice Capades.”  Rev. of Antarctica:  Firsthand Accounts of Exploration and Endurance, Ed. by Charles Neider.  The New York Review.  August 9, 2001.  15.

Bainbridge, Beryl.  “The Birthday Boys.”  Ice.  Ed. Clint Willis.  New York:  Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1999.

Huntford, Roland.  The Last Place on Earth.  New York:  Atheneum, 1985.  68-507.

Mitford, Nancy.  “A Bad Time.”  Ice.  Ed. Clint Willis.  New York:  Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1999.

Neider, Charles.  Edge of the World Ross Island, Antarctica.  Garden City, New York:  Doubleday &

          Company Inc.  1974.  286.

          “Beyond Cape Horn.”  Ice.  Ed. Clint Willis.  New York:  Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1999.

Pound, Reginald.  Scott of the Antarctic.  London:  World Books, 1968.  77.

Scott, Robert Falcon.  “Scott’s Last Expedition:  The Journals.”  Ice.  Ed. Clint Willis.  New York:  Thunder’s

          Mouth Press, 1999.

Spufford, Francis.  “I May Be Some Time.”  Ice.  Ed. Clint Willis.  New York:  Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1999.

Tracy, Elle.  “The Southern End of the Earth:  Antarctic Literature.”  395-399.