Dawlat Yassin

                           Lebanon, A Lost Identity

A few years ago, I attended a peace camp sponsored by UNISEF( a United Nation Agency). The camp aimed to promote harmony among people of different political, ethnic and religious backgrounds that make the social fabric of Lebanon. One of the participants, from a Christian background, expressed her belief that Lebanese are not Arabs. She claimed that her ancestors are Phoenicians. “The Lebanese constitution which gives Lebanon an Arabic face, makes no mention that it is an Arabic country”, she argued. That   constitution was approved by France during its colonization of Lebanon. It took me a while to grasp the depth of that girl’s statement, for it carries some truth. It is also shared by many of those who chose to cling to the new culture left behind by the Allied colonizers. It is that culture which portrayed Arabs as second grade human beings, and were able to associate them with Islam, despite the fact that Christians, Arab Jewish and Druze are also part of the Arabic culture throughout the region. Lebanese identity is lost between ethnicity (Arab, Syrian, Phoenician) and religion ( Sunni, Shia, Christian) and a mere Lebanese identity exempted from any ethnic or religious ambitions that could threaten the unity of Lebanon.

 The bleak image of the Lebanese politics today stems directly from the way the country was put together from the very beginning. “Modern Lebanon or ‘Greater Lebanon’ as it was called came into being in 1926 as an entity that European colonial powers cobbled together by layering a weak political system atop a congeries of Arabic –speaking but competing religious sects “(Safa  23). The new Lebanon was never adopted as a model for harmony. Sectarian feeling dominated among its citizens since its creation until today. “In this manner the Sunni population was increased by eight times, the Shia’s four times while the Maronite population increased only by one third. Thus no longer could the Maronites claim a Christian Lebanon”(Quibain 16). Muslim preferred the inclusion with Syria, some Christians saw Lebanon a “ ‘Christian island’ in a Muslim sea”(Qubain 17) while others liked to think of it as a part of Mediterranean culture rather than an Arabic one. Another completely different political trend was initiated by “the Syrian National Social Party that made considerable head way in Lebanon, Syria Jordan and Palestine. Fundamentally, this theory states that inhabitants of the Fertile Crescent, by social interaction, history and geography, are one nation – the Syrian Nation, and that they too, are different from the Arabs”(Quabain 17). At that time Pan -Arabism was still there and attracted supporters among almost all religious sects in Lebanon, but it was mostly a Muslim preference.

Those competitive religious and political sects always sought help from outside against each other. This means nothing other than the lack of alliance to a one unifying identity. Lebanon was meant to be a unique form of democracy, guided by a constitution approved by the colonizer country to protect the rights of all religious groups, but it ended up with a lame form of democracy. To further complicate matters, the colonizers left the country with an unwritten National Pact that mandated the division of staff to presidency and the army’s chief of staff to be Maronite Christians, the office of Prime minister to be a Sunni and the leadership of the Parliament to be Shiat Muslim.  

Since Independence there was great emphasis on efforts to strengthen and preserve the Lebanese Army to be the unifying institution of the nation. This was proven to be a lofty goal, for the nucleus of the Lebanese Army was founded by the French during colonization. The senior officers were “long- time supporters of France” (Barak 63), and most of them were French educated, in Lebanon and overseas, and speak French fluently. Barak, in his essay “Commemorating Malikiyya” tells that “unlike their Syrian counterparts, Lebanese officers and men did not rebel against their French commanders or defect” (Barak 63). This institution which later came to include members from all Lebanese sects, lacked cohesion for each group “held disparate views of the identity” (Barak 63), and often represented by politicians lacking  the vision or the courage to work for all Lebanese, rather than for their own religions sects or social groups. As a result, Lebanon has endured many conflicts between different groups for various reasons which ultimately lead to a long civil war.

Five years after independence and upon the creation of the state of Israel, ”some 726,000 Palestinians fled or expelled from Palestine, around 11,000 [mostly Sunni Muslims and a small number of Christians] of whom evacuated settled in Lebanon” (Khalili 11). With its fragile sectarian combination, Lebanon was forced to deal with this number of refugees that can change its sectarian balance. Christians and Shiat feared the increase of Sunni Moslems, at the time most Palestinian Christians were able to secure their naturalization as Lebanese citizens. Until this day, two generations of Sunni Palestinian refugees were born in Lebanon and live deprived of most essential human rights. The Lebanese government lacked resources to deal with such a catastrophe. Palestinian refugees were placed in camps and denied, til this day, the right to work! This very issue has came back to undermine the stability of Lebanon, for those refugees have gotten educated, demanded fair treatment and ultimately armed their political views with guns which only further complicated the fragile sanity of the country. “During Lebanese civil war (1975-91) Palestinians were at the very center of the conflict”(Khalili 11). They can not be but Arabs and they were always supported by the Pan- Arabic Lebanese. That support was far less effective in attaining civil rights compared to the case of their Christian countrymen who found instant approval upon their arrival in Lebanon!

            It was not long before other regional conflicts found their way to the Lebanese theater, especially after the Iranian revolution that toppled the Shah in 1979. “[T]he Iranians has influenced Hezbollah which emerged following Israel’s 1982 invasion, proudly concedes its featly to the supreme authority of the “leader” of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.”(Norton 142). Since the Islamic revolution,

the United States has pursued a series of incoherent policies toward Tehran. At various points, it has tried to topple the regime—even, on occasion, threatening military action. At others it has sought to hold talks and limited set of issues. Throughout, it has worked to box in Iran and to limit its influence in the region. But none of these approaches has worked, especially not containment which is still the strategy of choice in the Iran policy debate. (Takeyeh, Rayzzz)

Its enmity towards Tehran, along with its ultimate support of Israel, made The United States a natural enemy of  the Lebanese Shiat due to their alliance and identification with the Shiat revolutuion in Iran. This particular development has changed the map of alliances among religious and political groups in Lebanon. The old supporters of France, and many others joined them, started to identify with the United States and seek its protection against the opposite Syria -Tehran Camp.

Sixty five years of limited democracy and Lebanon is one step closer to chaos than it is  from ever finding and identity. There will always be those who seek outsiders’ help and support to achieve limited and often personal goals with no regard for the good of their other fellow citizens. And there will be those who seek their own identity, and feel no need to be colonized in order to have a better tomorrow.

                                                                         Works Cited

 Barak, Oren. “Commemorating Malikyya, Political, Multiethnic Identity And The Making of Lebanese Army” History and Memory 13.1 Spring/Summer 2001: 60-80. Project Muse U of Houston clear lake Lib. Houston TX . March 7 2008. http://libproxy.uhcl.edu/login?url=http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/history_and_memory/v013/13.1barak.pdf

Khalili, Laleh. “Places of Memory and Mourning:Palestinian Commemoration in The Refugee Camps in Lebanon” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 25.1 (2005): 30-45. Project Muse. U of Houston, Clear Lake Lib. March 7 2008. url=http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/comparative_studies_of_south_asia_africa
_and_the_middle_east/v025/25.1khalili.pdf

Norton, Augustus R. “Ritual Blood and Shite Identity” .TDR: the Drama Rview 49.4 (T188) Winter 2005: 140-55. Project Muse. U of Houston Clear Lake Lib.  March 8 2008.http://libproxy.uhcl.edu/login?url=http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/the_drama_review/v049/49.4norton.pdf

Quibain, Fahim I. Crisis in Lebanon, The Middle East Institute Washington DC.1961.

Safa, Oussama. “Getting to The Arab Democracy” Lebanon Springs Forward. Journal of Democracy 17.1. Jan. 2006: 22-37. Project Muse. U of Houston Clear Lake Lib.  Mar. 5 2008.http://
libproxy.uhcl.edu/login?url=http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v017/17.1editors.pdf

Takeyh, Ray. “Time for Détente with Iran” Foreign Affairs 86.2 Mar./Apr. 2007: 17-32. Academic Search Complete. U of Houston Clear Lake Lib. Mar. 8 2208.

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