James Simpson On Desire and Loss The reality that desire and loss are
inseparable from the nature and condition of being alive makes for good
literature, if not for happy lives. Good writing, like good music and good
painting, explores the deepest places of our souls where loss and joy
intermingle; we love, knowing that the objects of our affections are
impermanent—and this knowledge makes our loving the more powerful, and the
burdens of our eventual loss more intolerable. It is indeed arguable that
Romantic literature could not—and cannot—exist were Man born without original
sin, were he in fact born happy. Even whimsical romantic literature—stories of
quests and heroic deeds—are a quest to regain Paradise, to find, beyond hope, a
“far green country”[1]
where good deeds are rewarded and evil is punished. These tales are heroic
because we know that humanity fights “the long defeat”[2]
against the fates and our own inherent natures—in fantasy tales, Good sometimes
wins—unlike this life, at least, where evil usually prospers and the good suffer
more readily than the unjust. As such, to call a work Romantic is to say that it
explores this ever-present foreboding in the human heart that what we value most
will soon be taken from us. Fantasy tales—say, T.H. White’s
The Once and Future King—typically
approach loss and desire with a manly[3]
valor and optimism,[4]
with a confidence that battles, at least, in the long war of defeat of can be
won—that hope is at least as strong as despair. Suffice it to say that the three
works I have surveyed are not fantasy tales, and they are decidedly not hopeful;
F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Winter Dreams,
Thomas Wolfe’s The Lost Boy, and
Katherine Anne Porter’s The Grave are
in fact examples of the profound nihilism that is the indulgence of postmodern
man. Let us, therefore, see what these works have to say about the human
condition—let us see, and despair. The theme of these stories is the
same; they can all be considered as taking the same philosophical approach to
loss and desire: essentially, that our desire for our lost beloved are an
insupportable grief that is beyond the powers of time to reconcile or heal; they
are permanent wounds that know no balm. This is the kernel and soul of nihilism:
our souls, our hearts, are permanently and irrevocably lost. Let us examine in
brief how each of these works expresses this fear, and how each of their authors
are philosophers of despair; let us look at the great existential emptiness that
awaits us when we, too, lose that which we love most—whether our beloved, or,
perhaps, our own innocence which is apparently irrecoverable. We will start with
The Grave and that first and
universal experience of loss that is known (if not always felt)[5]
by all: the loss of innocence. Porter here gives us a glimpse of the moment when a girl loses
her innocence, when she becomes fully aware of the difference between our
expectation of goodness from the universe, and the reality of suffering
experienced by helpless creatures; here Miranda first experiences that
instinctive impulse to recoil from the truth about our inherent natures; here
she first experiences the guilt and revulsion that all good people at times feel
about their true selves: She looked and looked [at the rabbit fetuses]… --filled with
pity and astonishment and a kind of shocked delight in the wonderful little
creatures for their own sakes, they were so pretty. She touched one of them ever
so carefully. ‘Ah, there’s blood running over them,’ she said, and began to
tremble without knowing why. Yet she wanted most deeply to see and to know.
Having seen, she felt at once as if she had known all along. The very memory of
her former ignorance faded, she had always known this. [15] Her brother Paul, too, experiences
this will to hide his deed,[6]
although one suspects that his spiritual and intellectual awakening to the
unlovely things of nature and existence came somewhat before this experience
with the rabbits. He does, however, betray that shame and that even the remotely
sensitive instinctively feel when confronted with something that ought not to
be—such as seeing helpless young torn—albeit “innocently” (because he didn’t
know that the rabbit was pregnant when he shot it) —from their mother’s womb;
his first impulse, like that of all but the rare saints among us, is to hide his
guilt—to hide, at least existentially, his shame of being human: Paul buried the young rabbits again in their mother’s body,
wrapped the skin around her, and carried her to a clump of sage bushes and hid
her away. He came out again at once and said to Miranda, with an eager
friendliness, a confidential tone quite unusual in him, as if he were taking her
into an important secret on equal terms: ‘Listen now. Now you listen to me, and
don’t ever forget. Don’t you ever tell a living soul that you saw this. Don’t
tell a soul.’ [16] There is something terribly poignant—and proper—about those
creatures being returned to their mother’s womb in death; that Paul sensed this
is proof of his own better nature, and proof that
The Grave is not entirely a work of
existential nihilism. That title might be applied with justice to Fitzgerald’s
Winter Dreams.
I’d argue that
Winter Dreams is implicitly also
about the loss of innocence, rather than about the madness of unreachable desire
that is it’s more obvious subject. The philosophical conclusion that Fitzgerald
reaches is different than Porter’s because
Winter Dreams fundamentally lacks the
flicker of hope for the human condition that Paul’s gesture in
The Grave implies. In
Winter Dreams, the presence of
unreachable desire itself ruins innocence; therefore, the man who desires has
become aware of the terrible truths of human existence—he has in fact become
guilty, because he has awoken to unbearable knowledge. Man can never be clean
because the awakening of fundamental knowledge—just as in the Garden in
Genesis—forever stains Man’s soul. I suspect that volumes of dissertations have
been written about what Judy metaphorically represents. My own short thesis is a
rather obvious observation (although most truths are plain): she is the serpent
in the Garden of his soul. And, just as in Genesis, the seduction and Fall of
Man begins with a taste of the forbidden fruit: Then she smiled and the corners of her mouth drooped and an
almost imperceptible sway brought her closer to him, looking up into his eyes. A
lump rose in Dexter’s throat, and he waited breathless for the experiment,
facing the unpredictable compound that would form mysteriously from the elements
of their lips. Then he saw—she communicated her excitement to him, lavishly,
deeply, with kisses that were not a promise but a fulfillment. They aroused in
him not hunger demanding renewal but surfeit that would demand more surfeit …
kisses that were like charity, creating want by holding back nothing at all. It
did not take him many hours to decide that he had wanted Judy Jones ever since
he was a proud, desirous little boy. [3.19-3.20] These kisses are, metaphorically, as the forbidden fruit in
the garden; they lead to desires that not only cannot be satiated, but also
cannot be gratified without madness—indeed, even the fleeting gratification of
the desire, the kiss (which was itself merely a temptation to further desire,
rather than a consummation of affection)—leads one to a madness from which there
is no recovery. Thus, when Dexter learns that Judy’s loveliness is gone, he
experiences not relief that the temptation has been removed, but instead further
madness because the desire must hereafter exist without hope of gratification.
Whereas there was once hope beyond hope that Judy might kiss him again—and so
return him to that Summer night when desire was first whetted, now there is just
final knowledge that the unbearable and unwholesome loveliness of Judy will
remain a memory to torment him: The dream was gone. Something had been taken from him. In a
sort of panic he pushed the palms of his hands into his eyes and tried to bring
up a picture of… her mouth damp to his kisses and her eyes plaintive with
melancholy and her freshness like new fine linen in the morning. Why, these
things were no longer in the world! They had existed and they existed no
longer…. For the first time in years the tears were streaming down his face… He
wanted to care, and he could not care. For he had gone away and he could never
go back any more. The gates were closed, the sun was gone down, and there was no
beauty but the gray beauty of steel that withstands all time. Even the grief he
could have borne was left behind in the country of illusion, of youth, of the
richness of life, where his winter dreams had flourished. ‘Lone ago,’ he said,
‘long ago, there was something in me, but now that thing is gone. Now that thing
is gone, that thing is gone. I cannot cry. I cannot care. That thing will come
back no more.’ [6.34-6.36] Again, we have final and irredeemable loss of innocence and
hope. In this story desire necessarily leads to loss and madness, which begets
more desire. Winter Dreams is a
romantic story, not merely because Fitzgerald beautifully employs the language
of longing that is the hallmark of Romanticism, but because the story yearns for
that far-off and better place where desire and longing are satisfied—but ends
with the nihilistic conclusion that all is lost, that the natural condition of
the mature human soul is one of abandoned and empty loneliness.
Thomas Wolfe’s
The Lost Boy extends this theme of
nihilistic loss even further, going so far as to cast its protagonist, Grover,
as an incarnate Christ-like figure that experiences no triumphant resurrection;
when Grover dies, there is only an emptiness that refuses to fill—a place of
hurt and longing that cannot be healed, because Grover, whom was good, is lost,
and his death was a nihilistic and meaningless chance event that proves that
existential fairness is not only dead, but in fact never existed—reality as such
is not immoral, but amoral—there is no good standard by which to judge Grover’s
illness as bad. Grover was god—and god is dead.
From the beginning of the story, Grover is
foreshadowed as a prophetic or holy figure; an incarnate soul, quiet and
sensitive, who suffers, like Christ, unjust rebukes—the wicked Crockers, like
all sinners, instinctively hate the just. As in the Gospels, Grover experiences
his temptation, his “why hast thou forsaken me” moment, although he experiences
this crisis not in relation to a heavenly father, but in terms of his
existential existence. There was Before, the time before his shame, and Now,
after his shame, and a gulf lies between the former and the latter selves.
Perhaps the god Grover has lost his own innocence and has become aware that the
universe is capricious and unjust. Note the disillusion: He felt the overwhelming soul-sickening guilt that all the
children, all the good men of the earth, have felt since Time began. And even
anger had died down, had been drowned out, in this swelling tide of guilt, and
‘This is—the Square’—thought Grover as before—“This is Now. There is my father’s
shop. And all of it is as it has always been, save I.’ [1.51] Indeed, suggestions throughout the story that Grover is a
suffering Christ figure are many. That his father is an engraver of tombstones
is foreshadowing of death. In retrospect his sister understood that Grover was a
kind of prophet: “My Lord! Poor little Grover. He wasn’t quite twelve years old
at the time, but he seemed so grown up to us. I was two years older, but I
thought he knew it all. It was always that way with him. Looking back now, it
sometimes seems that it was Grover who brought us up.’” [3.12] He even had a
stigmata (granted, not a Biblical reference, but one that is associated with
Catholicism), the birthmark on his neck. [3.27] Finally, there is the train ride
to St. Louis that can be understood as his journey to Jerusalem, and the Fair
represents both the temporal Temple, holiest of places in that holy city—and
Paradise itself. Grover, like, Christ, was going down to Jerusalem to die. The metaphors here end, as Grover does not rise from the dead,
there is no victory over death; Grover went to St. Louis—went to Jerusalem—to
die, and all that is left for his mother, and brother and sister is regret and
emptiness. Note, in particular, the unsupportable sadness of this: His mother, a
lonely woman, speaks aloud to herself, addressing, in this terrible vacancy,
children that are not there: It was so long ago, but when I think of it, it all comes
back, as if it happened yesterday. Now all of you have either died or grown up
and gone away, and nothing is the same as it was then. But all of you were there
with me that morning and I guess I should remember how the others looked, but
somehow I don’t. Yet I can still see Grover just the way he looked that morning
when we went down through Indiana, by the river, to the Fair. [2.27] The journey of Grover’s brother Eugene back to the family’s
home in St. Louis after many years can be understood as his own search for
redemption, his search to find liberation, even salvation; I think that the
brother assumed that the years passed since Grover’s death would impart wisdom
within him—that he would find meaning in the loss; that he would understand the
greater good that came from Grover’s death. Alas, no such good was found—only a
worse and final shock to his soul as he realized that there was neither purpose
nor redemption in Grover’s death; there was, in fact, no resurrection: Eugene… went on till he found the place. And so at last he
turned into the street, finding the place where the two corners met, the huddled
block, the turret, and the steps, and paused a moment, looking back, as if the
street were Time. For a moment he stood there, waiting—for a word, and for a
door to open, for the child to come. He waited, but no words were spoken; no one
came [4.15-4.15]…. ‘Here is the House and here House listening; here is Absence,
Absence in the afternoon; and here in this House, this Absence, is my core, my
kernel—here am I!’ [4.64] Absence and loss; this is the kernel of the Romance narrative, if Fitzgerald, Porter, and Wolfe can be taken as representative authors within the genre. Is there any reason why this theme of loss and desire should be inherent to Romanticism? The answer is simply this: Romanticism explores the deep impulses and fears of the human heart. Because the human condition is fraught with longing for that far green country of our souls, the Romantic narrative is defined by the answers that we can find to explain the existential problems of existence. Among these three authors, Porter offers us a glimpse of that better place, while Fitzgerald and Wolfe find no balm for our souls; there is only an eternal Now of emptiness.
[1] Tolkien
[2] Ibid
[3] The question
will, no doubt, be asked: Are you suggesting that anything—or at least
any Romantic thing not in the
fantasy genre is unmanly, is in fact feminine? Yes. Fantasy is at least
a more dependable guardian of the almost extinct modern virtues of stoic
resolve; it is, in fact, more
manly—and that is a good thing. It is far better to face evil and
hopeless chances in the spirit of Macaulay’s
Horatius than the modern “men
without chests” that the philosopher Frances Schaeffer rightly observes.
This doesn’t mean that I think that postmodern writing can’t be good—the
three works that are the subject of this essay are profoundly good—it
does mean, however, that I think that nihilism is an abject surrender to
the fates; it is far better to defy our doom with grim confidence. And,
while we cannot expect our fellows—or even, perhaps, ourselves—to be
equipped with the psychological resources of Horatius, we can at least
hope that our literature will make us better, not worse. Nihilism erodes
our ability to face our own private pains with fortitude. ‘Then out
spake brave Horatius, The Captain of
the Gate: ‘To every man
upon this earth Death cometh
soon or late. And how can
man die better Than by facing
fearful odds, For the ashes
of his fathers, And the
temples of his Gods.’ – Macaulay Pedants such as myself will note, however, that not
all Fantasies are in fact Romantic. George R.R. Martin’s
A Song of Ice and Fire saga
could perhaps be called a Realist Fantasy; it is a soul-coarsening
masterpiece of the most profound nihilism and despair. This is a world
that no sane person would wish to be born into. Much as Tolkien’s Middle
Earth is a better Earth in an alternate universe, so is Martin’s world a
worse Earth in a more horrifying universe; Tolkien planet is Paradise
partly regained; Martin’s is paradise not merely utterly lost, but
perhaps never existent.
[4] Even a
pessimist can be hopeful—so long as he looks upon this habit as a happy
folly; the pessimist who never hopes becomes a cynic—a man who is
himself a nihilist with more disagreeable habits; someone who cannot
hold a conversation without becoming an angry or insufferable bore.
[5] If we are to
not utterly abandon ourselves to nihilism, we must hope that, while a
state of sin may be the “crooked timber of our humanity” (Immanuel
Kant), we are at least not born with souls tarnished and debased by
evil—that babies, at least, or not born evil, because that condition
requires deeds to turn one’s heart black. As such, the believer in free
will may, perhaps, be wrong, but he can robustly defend virtue, while
the determinist struggles to make distinctions between right and wrong
with conviction. Free will is a
manly philosophical principle in the spirit of Horatius; Determinism
surrenders the Gate without a fight.
[6] It is
notable, however, that the deed itself was arguably not wicked; there
may be good reasons for shooting game, and even acceptable reasons if
not philosophically robust, such as preferring the taste of rabbit.
However, what is further notable is that we have a deep and persistent
intuition that the laws of nature are not those of the best possible
world—that a better world would be one where “They shall not hurt or
destroy in all my holy mountain. (Isaiah 11:9)
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